Developers are writing and generating more code than ever. The question is no longer whether the code can be shipped; it’s whether it should be trusted. Join us on September 29 for a virtual session on GitHub Advanced Security, where you'll learn: • How to get a comprehensive view of the vulnerabilities in your codebase, including areas traditional scanning tools might miss. • How GitHub Code Security helps you turn findings into validated, review-ready pull requests, so you can shrink your backlog. • Tangible next steps on how you can automatically apply standards and make trust a consistent part of the development process. Register here 👇 https://lnkd.in/eQWsCuZd
more code doesn't mean better code tbh. the real problem is devs shipping stuff they don't even understand because some tool generated it. security scanning is fine but it won't fix that core issue imo
The speed of code has increased. So has the responsibility over it. Security needs to be part of the process, not an afterthought📊
This is the right shift in the security conversation: faster code generation only helps if teams can see what changed, understand the risk, and move from finding to review-ready fix without breaking flow. Making that path measurable is where trust becomes practical.
Reviewing generated code properly is quickly becoming the slowest part of the workflow, so anything that makes the trust question easier to answer is welcome.
Shipping faster only helps if security keeps pace with development. The real value is turning vulnerability findings into actionable fixes within the existing workflow, rather than creating another backlog for engineering teams to manage.
Shipping more code is easy; keeping it maintainable is the hard part. Clear ownership, small PRs, and a high-signal review bar still decide long-term velocity.
Strong framing. Trust in AI-assisted code needs both automated checks and a review workflow that makes failures easy to trace.
GitHub, “How to Trust the Code You Ship” leaves the harder problem unresolved. Code can satisfy every scan, policy, review, and control at state₀. That establishes evidence about state₀. It does not establish continued qualification at stateₙ after dependencies, configuration, generated code, execution context, or authority materially change. And component validity does not automatically compose: trusted(A) + trusted(B) + trusted(C) ≠ trusted(A∘B∘C). So define the actual trust invariant. What evidence survives state transition? What forces requalification? What prevents individually valid components from producing an unauthorized or unqualified composed outcome? And what proves the deployed system still deserves the trust established at an earlier state? If “trust” cannot answer those questions, you are not continuously trusting the system. You are carrying historical qualification forward and assuming it still applies. September 29 should be interesting. ♟️ — Bamboozled Labs °°😈♟️🫣 Basement Engineer
Great focus on shifting security left identifying and addressing vulnerabilities within the development workflow can make secure software delivery much more efficient.
Generated code moves the bottleneck downstream to validation. Your review process speed becomes the gate. Trust is only as consistent as your validation velocity.