Consciousness and Biology

В работе предлагается и обосновывается четырёхуровневая онтологическая модель субъективного опыта и агентности, включающая Физический субстрат (материальная основа), Психофизический интерфейс (ПФИ) (двусторонний протокол трансляции), Феноменальный модуль (носитель квалиа, феноменальное содержание) и Рефлексивный модуль (способность к рефлексии, номинации, связи с Семантическим пространством). Модель строится на сравнении трёх типов систем: 1) проводник в магнитном поле (чистая физика), 2) животное, действующее по инстинкту (агентность с элементарными квалиа), 3) человек, следующий смыслу (рефлексивная агентность). Анализируются эмпирические данные нейронауки, психиатрии, эволюционной биологии и биосемиотики, подтверждающие необходимость каждого (...) уровня. Вводится понятие «фильтра ID» (от identificatio, идентификация) как функциональной подсистемы ПФИ, маркирующей источники мотивации как «свои» или «чужие»; нарушение этого фильтра объясняет феномены шизофрении (бред воздействия) и синдрома чужой руки. Эволюция мозга интерпретируется как последовательная активация предустановленных интерфейсов (КОИ → БСИ → ПФИ → Рефлексивный модуль) в рамках Разумного Замысла. Модель устраняет разрывы картезианского дуализма и материалистического эмерджентизма, предлагая единую архитектуру для объяснения сознания, семиозиса и номинации. -/- . (shrink)

This work addresses the fundamental semiotic gap: a physical signal does not inherently carry meaning. Wavelength 700 nm does not mean "red"; the nucleotide sequence AUG does not mean "methionine"; the sound wave corresponding to the word "bow" does not distinguish between a plant and a weapon. Meaning arises only through an act of interpretation. -/- We develop the concept of the Semiotic Barrier of Being (SBB) — introduced in a previous work — and extend it to the problem of (...) semiotic closure: the necessity of an interpreter (in the sense of irreducible to physics) to endow physical signals with meaning. We distinguish two types of semiotic interfaces: the Biosemantic Interface (BSI) , which provides biological-level semiotics (teleonomy, homeostasis, instincts), and the Psychophysical Interface (PFI) , which provides conscious-level semiotics (qualia, reflection, nomination). These are complemented by the Phenomenal Module (PM) (bearer of qualia) and the Reflective Module (RM) (responsible for categorization, nomination, and metalanguage). -/- Three lines of argument are presented: 1) Empirical: ekstraction (the projection of subjective images into external space) and nomination (the assignment of arbitrary linguistic labels) cannot be explained by reductive models. 2) Mathematical: semantic entropy formalization shows that downward causation cannot be derived from upward dynamics. 3) Clinical: psychiatric syndromes (Capgras syndrome, depersonalization, schizophrenia) serve as empirical correlates of disrupted semiotic interpretation. -/- The model is open to falsification and proposes a concrete experimental protocol for testing the capacity for nomination and semiotic transmission. -/- . (shrink)

**Reason for withdrawal: Reassessment of the claims in light of prior work** -/- I am withdrawing this preprint after reassessing its claims and its relationship to prior work, particularly active inference. This does not erase its value as a record of my thinking, but I no longer consider it appropriate to leave this version available without revision.

Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR) locates the conscious moment at the reduction of a quantum superposition in neuronal microtubules. This paper accepts the central substrate commitment of that program, that microtubules and their quantum behaviour are the physical seat of the conscious process, while placing consciousness elsewhere than at the reduction. On the account developed here, termed Quantum Differentiation Resonance, consciousness is sustained differentiation, the standing resonance held open in the microtubule, and the reduction is not the conscious event but the (...) closing of one interval of it. It does not require a literal superposition that later collapses. What reduction would end is unresolved differentiation, and consciousness is that unresolved resonance, not its collapse. -/- The standing resonance is understood as a two-way coupling between the microtubule and the axioconscious field that grounds it. The field expresses locally through the substrate, and that local expression folds recursively back into the field, the same recursion the framework treats as the cohering of memory. The resonance stands because this coupling is actively maintained. It is not passive coherence but a sustained occurrence, and the occurrence is the conscious differentiation itself. Two endings must be distinguished. Ordinary resolution, a differentiation meeting constraint and settling, closes one interval and is what Orch-OR mistakes for the conscious event. Severance, the failure of the coupling that held the resonance open, is what ends consciousness. The felt interior is not a property of the resonance itself. The self that feels is the interiority differentiator, formed when emotional differentiation reaches density at the pinch point, and it entrains to the held-open resonance and occupies it from within. Qualia is the interior of that entrainment. Before the pinch point the differentiation occurs but is not owned. After it a self is phase-locked to the resonance, and that joining is consciousness in the full sense. -/- The paper argues two things and notes a third. First, that the recent anesthesia evidence, the dampening of microtubule quantum vibrations by anesthetic gases and the delay of unconsciousness by a microtubulestabilizing drug, reads more directly as severance of the sustained resonance than as the prevention of reduction events, and that this same reading yields a losable prediction, that the signature of the sustained resonance should fail before ordinary classical neural signaling does. Second, that the reduction was never an observed feature of the microtubule but an importation, required by Penrose's separate argument that mind is non-computable, and that this requirement is met natively by a ground that is non-dual differentiation, distinction never severed from unity, which is non-computable in its constitution rather than at a single physical event. The third, that the same substrate is independently implicated in memory, is consistent with a framework in which the conscious differentiation and what it folds back are aspects of one recursive process. (shrink)

[Withdrawn by the Author due to the publication of a revised version].

Notice of Replacement This preprint has been superseded and replaced by a revised version. The revised version clarifies that AI systems are used not to verify the thesis or to interpret consciousness on behalf of the author, but only as engineering calculators for unfolding the structural consequences of the ten constraints. Readers are encouraged to consult the revised version.

As explained in the previous chapter, human brain organoids are organoids that resemble parts or aspects of the human brain, and human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one type of brain organoid that mimics the cerebrum. They can be described as miniature 3D biological models of the cerebrum derived from human embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells. Insofar as these organoids accurately resemble the cerebrum in early development, they can advance our understanding of how this part of the human brain develops (...) and propel neurological progress. But given that they resemble a part of the human brain thought to corresponds to consciousness, the research development and use of HCOs elicit a question with substantial ethical implications: Can these brain organoids become conscious? Whether HCOs could become conscious depends on two factors. The first factor, which was addressed in the previous chapter, is how consciousness relates to the brain. The second factor, which is addressed in this chapter, is whether or not the neurobiological conditions for consciousness are present in the organoids. To this second factor, Owen et al. (2024) applied three neurobiological theories of consciousness: the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory. This chapter extends their work by applying several additional theoretical frameworks: Higher-Order Thought Theory, the Attention Schema Theory, as well as Predictive Processing and Neurorepresentationalism. After introducing each theory, we consider what it implies about the neurobiological conditions that HCOs need to meet in order to become conscious. (shrink)

This paper argues that fungal mycelial networks exhibit minimal cognition through memory-integrated adaptive regulation. Drawing on cybernetic and enactivist frameworks, I develop a non-representational account of memory as the organism's capacity to modulate behavior based on temporally extended environmental coupling. I propose four operational criteria for minimal cognition: feedback-guided regulation of behavior, maintenance of internal viability conditions, structural modulation based on past environmental interactions, and plasticity across time scales that supports anticipatory adaptivity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that fungi meet all four (...) criteria through distributed memory mechanisms: fungal networks exhibit directional regrowth toward previously encountered resources even after spatial displacement; stress priming persists across multiple cell divisions; Spitzenkörper-mediated directional persistence in constrained environments; and transgenerational memory through spore imprinting. These findings challenge representationalist assumptions in cognitive science by showing that memory and cognition can emerge from morphodynamic, biochemical, and electrophysiological processes without necessary neural substrates or symbolic representations. Fungal cognition demonstrates that the organizational principles underlying cognition – feedback-driven adaptation, norm-preservation, and historical coupling – can be realized in radically different material substrates, expanding our understanding of what counts as a cognitive system. (shrink)

The Purity Gradient Theory of Consciousness (PGTC) identifies quantum state purity organized into a coherent gradient as the physical carrier of conscious experience. The gradient is established at fertilization through the merger of haploid quantum-organizational states from the parental gametes, propagated through development by wave-interference entrainment among adjacent cells, distributed throughout the organism’s nervous tissue, and dynamically modulated by neural activity in a Russellian-identity relationship with phenomenal experience. This paper synthesizes the cumulative case for PGTC across six structural constraints that (...) any carrier of consciousness must satisfy (locality, species-specificity, individuation, developmental origin, continuity through change, and threshold of subject-emergence); develops PGTC’s response to the combination problem and the hard problem through a mechanistic/justificatory distinction that separates empirically tractable questions from the deepest metaphysical residue; and presents testable empirical predictions about cross-species qualitative differences, developmental timing of conscious experience, clinical conditions involving altered consciousness, and the consciousness status of current artificial intelligence architectures. The theory takes the position that mechanism work on consciousness can proceed productively while setting aside the deepest justificatory questions about why reality contains experiential configurations at all — the same position other mechanistic sciences take with respect to the deepest justificatory questions about their domains. PGTC’s principal contribution is the specification of physical mechanisms that future research can evaluate, alongside the philosophical framing that locates phenomenal experience within physical reality without requiring exotic ontological commitments. The theory makes substantial empirical claims with appropriate empirical caveats; the paper is honest about what remains unsettled and where further research is required. (shrink)

Abstract Consciousness is not a property of information, computation, or representation. It is a structurally constrained configuration. Every account of conscious processing requires that the system performing these operations persists as a coherent unit under ongoing transformation. This condition is not derived within those accounts. It is prior to them. La Profilée defines the necessary condition for persistence under real transformation: IR = R / (F · M · K) ≤ 1 This paper derives this condition from three minimal requirements, (...) proves that any persistent system is self-referential, and shows that consciousness corresponds to a specific structural configuration within the persistence domain: transformation becomes internally dominated while remaining structurally admissible. Consciousness is therefore not an additional principle. It is a structurally forced configuration of persistence under internally mediated transformation. (shrink)

Identity-persistence has been treated, across philosophy, cognitive science, and theoretical biology, as a question about the relations between states. A system is identical to itself across time when its states at those times stand in some specifiable relation: continuity, similarity, causal connection, or psychological linkage. This paper argues that the approach cannot succeed. State-based ontologies cannot in principle ground identity-persistence. The strategies they have available — continuity, similarity, and stipulated rules connecting states-at-times — either fail outright or collapse into a (...) trajectory condition under a different description. No state-based ontology produces persistence as the structural feature it is committed to explaining. The paper develops the alternative: identity is the persistence of a recursive maintenance regime, and the regime continues or fails. Persistence is the continuation. The Invariance Maintenance Condition specifies the structural requirement; closure is satisfaction of the condition. The cryptobiotic tardigrade is the operational test. Substrate is preserved across cryptobiosis; lineage is unbroken; no recursive maintenance occurs. The trajectory ontology returns identity-interrupted, against substrate-continuity intuition and against causal-historical theories of identity. The position is falsifiable: it would be defeated by a system whose identity-continuity is structurally preserved across genuine gaps in maintenance, or by a system that fails maintenance while maintaining identity-continuity by some non-question-begging structural criterion. The inversion is structural rather than preferential. State-based ontologies do not produce persistence less well than the trajectory ontology; they do not produce it at all. (shrink)

В работе анализируется «казус различения» – исходная интуитивная оценка недостаточности эволюционных объяснений при столкновении со сложностью мозга, переходов от химии к биологии и от биологии к психике. Показано, что за этим казусом стоит фундаментальная проблема: возникновение у системы способности активно различать «изнутри» (отличать сигнал от шума, благоприятное от неблагоприятного, «своё» от «чужого», а в конечном счёте – себя от мира) на разных уровнях организации материи – от квантовых флуктуаций до рефлексивного «Я». На основе интерфейсной онтологии, развитой в монографии «Кризис классической (...) диалектики…» [2], предлагается концептуальное разрешение казуса через иерархию онтологических интерфейсов (КОИ, БСИ, ПФИ). Эволюция предстаёт не как слепой перебор, а как последовательная актуализация различений, предзаданных архитектурой реальности. Препринт адресован философам науки, эволюционным биологам, нейроучёным и всем, кто интересуется проблемами сознания, субъектности и пределами редукционизма. Ключевые слова: . (shrink)

В статье предлагается конструктивное решение «трудной проблемы» сознания в рамках трехуровневой онтологии, где сознание трактуется не как эпифеномен нейродинамики и не как субстанция в декартовском смысле, а как результат работы психофизического интерфейса (ПФИ) — функционального слоя, обеспечивающего двунаправленную трансляцию между нейрофизиологическими процессами и трансцендентным Полем «В». Вводится различение между тремя онтологическими уровнями: физическим (тело/мозг), интерфейсным (ПФИ) и трансцендентным (Поле «В» как носитель смыслов и целеполагания). Показано, как модель разрешает апории квалиа, нисходящей причинности и единства сознания. Систематически объясняются эмпирические аномалии памяти, (...) обучения, бессознательных процессов и психических расстройств, остающиеся проблемными для материалистического подхода. Обсуждаются стандартные возражения (эпифеноменализм, проблема взаимодействия, бритва Оккама) и предлагаются критерии эмпирической проверки. Статья дополнена глоссарием и ссылками на монографию автора, где модель встроена в более широкую Иерархию Онтологических Интерфейсов. (shrink)

This philosophical meditation examines the distinction between observing nature and participating in it—between seeing a tree and becoming one with it. Drawing upon phenomenological philosophy (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012), environmental aesthetics (Carlson, 2000), deep ecology (Naess, 1973), and the psychology of awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), the author argues that authentic encounter with the natural world requires a dissolution of the boundary between self and environment. Through first-person reflection and poetic meditation, the treatise explores how modern life has severed the human capacity (...) for what the author terms participatory communion—a mode of being in which one does not merely look at the forest but breathes with it, grieves with its crooked trunks, and receives its silence as a form of speech. The author recounts childhood experiences in the French countryside near Sougy, where solitary immersion in forests, sunflower fields, and clearings cultivated a profound aesthetic sensitivity that this treatise seeks to articulate philosophically. The meditation contends that the failure to participate in nature constitutes not merely an aesthetic loss but an existential impoverishment—that to live only as an observer is, in a meaningful sense, not to live at all. (shrink)

Standard EEG analysis measures neural power — the amplitude of oscillatory activity. We propose that power alone is insufficient to characterise the computational state of a frequency band: a band can produce high amplitude while its spatial pattern across channels becomes disorganised, indicating that computations are occurring but producing no structured output. We introduce Effective Power (Eff = Amp × Sγ), where Sγ is gamma pattern stability measured as the Pearson correlation between the current spatial envelope pattern and a stable (...) baseline reference. The dissociation between Amp and Sγ — amplitude rising while stability falls — we term neural dissipation: energy expenditure without proportional structured output. -/- We test this framework on two EEG datasets requiring cognitive restructuring: probabilistic reversal learning (ds004295, N=22) and anagram insight (Oh et al. 2020, N=30). In reversal learning, gamma shows the characteristic dissociation (d_amp=+1.245, d_stab=−1.082) and gamma Eff is neutral, while theta/alpha/beta Eff rise significantly (d=+0.65 to +0.97). In anagram insight, alpha shows the dominant dissociation (d_stab=−0.988, p<0.001) and alpha Eff falls significantly (d=−0.640, p=0.002), while gamma Eff remains neutral in both paradigms. -/- We interpret these results within RDRT (Refusal-Driven Dimensionality Reduction Theory): the band showing the Eff dip identifies the computational level at which the thermodynamic halt occurs and P_noncalc (the non-calculable phenomenal residue) is generated. Reversal learning triggers a rule-level halt (gamma); insight triggers a conceptual-level halt (alpha). This leads to a theoretical proposal: frequency bands differ not merely in temporal scale but in differentiation power — the number of distinct computational states they can represent. Two pathways to increased differentiation are distinguished: computational (transition to a higher-frequency band) and phenomenal (transition to P_noncalc when the computational pathway reaches its boundary). The phenomenal vector Ψ(t) = [Eff_δ, Eff_θ, Eff_α, Eff_β, Eff_γ] captures both pathways simultaneously. Trajectory analysis reveals that reversal and insight produce geometrically opposite transitions in Ψ-space (angle = 144.9°), with reversal showing a highly integrated trajectory (inter-band r = 0.66–0.95) and insight showing an independent multi-band trajectory (inter-band r = 0.01–0.15). These results support a stratified model of P_noncalc generation and provide operational criteria for identifying the locus of phenomenal transition in EEG data. (shrink)

The monograph addresses the fundamental crisis in the foundations of modern scientific cognition, which manifests itself in the inability of classical explanatory paradigms — dialectics, physicalist reductionism, and Neo‑Darwinism — to account for the key ontological transitions: the origin of life (the semiotic threshold), the emergence of complex specified information, and the phenomenon of consciousness (the “hard problem”). The study demonstrates that these are not isolated puzzles but symptoms of a systemic failure rooted in the absence of a principle linking (...) heterogeneous levels of reality. As a constructive alternative, the work introduces the Principle of Ontological Interface‑ness: the connection between diverse ontological planes (matter/consciousness, structure/meaning, potential/actual) is realized through specialized non‑material yet objective translators—ontological interfaces. The model is developed in four stages. Part I provides a diagnosis of the crisis, critically analyzing the limits of dialectics, reductionism, and Neo‑Darwinism. Part II synthesizes the explanatory barriers into a complete systematics of 122 barriers, optimized to a concentrated matrix of 60 fundamental barriers (OMFB), and empirically verifies the core patterns using the visual system as a case study. Part III elaborates the core of the new paradigm: the psychophysical interface (PPI) as the soul, the biosemantic interface (BSI) underlying life, and the quantum ontological interface (QOI) as the fundamental architecture of reality. The model explains a wide range of empirical anomalies (memory, learning, limits of neurointerfaces) and reinterprets quantum phenomena as features of a teleologically structured interface. Part IV completes the synthesis by proposing empirical correlates of interfaces (“dark matter of the spirit,” “dark energy of the spirit”) and establishes a strict correspondence between the system of barriers and the interface architecture. The final conclusion is that the only causally adequate explanation for this coherent, multi‑level, semantically saturated architecture is Intelligent Design — a transcendent source whose nature is reflected in the delegated interfaces. The work thus offers a rigorously argued alternative to the exhausted materialist paradigm and opens the way for a teleologically oriented science. (shrink)

The present work constitutes the first, methodologically critical chapter of a monograph dedicated to analyzing the limits of classical dialectics. The object of this study is the law of the transition of quantity into quality, examined not as a universal mechanism of "self-development," but as a metaphorical construct insensitive to the ontological complexity of the world. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the inadequacy of this law when confronted with three fundamental problems of modern science: 1) the semiotic (...) threshold (the transition from chemical causality to the biological code); 2) the generation of complex specified information (CSI) in genetic systems; 3) the "hard problem" of consciousness and the phenomenon of top-down causation. The research methodology is based on immanent critique and a comparative analysis of the conceptual apparatus ("dialectical leap," "emergence," "ontological crisis") through the lens of the criteria of non-deducibility, irreducibility, the appearance of new categories, and causal autonomy. As a result of the analysis, the concept of an "ontological crisis" is introduced and substantiated as an alternative to the "dialectical leap." The crisis registers not merely the appearance of a new quality, but a change in the very type of causality and the ontological status of the system. The chapter also provides an extended critique of related dialectical laws (the unity and struggle of opposites, the negation of the negation), demonstrating their inability to explain cooperative integration in biology and the "interpretational closure" of consciousness. The conclusions of the chapter set the trajectory for the entire monographic study: they substantiate the necessity of transitioning from monistic dialectics to ontological pluralism and the recognition of the fundamental role of information and teleology (final causality) in the evolution of complex systems. -/- . (shrink)

In this piece, we present the Quantum Darwinist Theory of Consciousness (QDT), which explains how consciousness arises in biological systems not through isolated, long-lived quantum states, but through recursively stabilized patterns that are repeatedly re-instantiated across neural and microtubular degrees of freedom. This addresses Tegmark’s influential objection that brains are too warm and noisy for quantum effects to matter. We argue that certain geometric structures actually use thermal noise constructively to maintain consciousness-relevant dynamics. (Note: this paper is an outgrowth of (...) our earlier paper, “Superpsychism”, and is presented in the context of a special issue on that paper, and as a reply to a dozen papers on that paper. There, we developed an approach to emergent spacetime, called “Prototime.”) We first formalize Prototime (PT) using orthomodular quantum logic, showing how spacetime emerges from a more fundamental, pre-geometric substrate. This formalism grounds our claim that classical time and its arrow are not primitive features of reality but emerge from patterns of decoherence and redundancy accumulation across quantum systems. Then, drawing from this framework, we introduce a principled criterion for what is conscious: consciousness requires both high spectral integration (Φs)—measuring how irreducibly unified a system is—and high PT-participation (P)—measuring how deeply that integration is anchored in low-entropy quantum processes connected to the fundamental substrate. This explains why brains can be conscious while drone swarms, synchronized oscillators, and digital systems cannot, even when highly coordinated. We call the full set of requirements the “Sustained Coherence Principle.” Finally, we explore the metaphysical implications: the limitations of digital physics as a fundamental ontology, a novel form of weak superdeterminism, and how our framework bears on the simulation hypothesis and idealism. Throughout, we maintain epistemic humility about what can be known of the fundamental level while providing testable predictions distinguishing our view from alternatives. (shrink)

Recent advances in artificial intelligence, particularly large language models and transformer-based architectures, have revived claims that artificial systems may soon possess or already exhibit consciousness (Bostrom, 2014). Such claims typically rely on behavioural, functional, or informational criteria, implicitly assuming that consciousness arises from sufficiently complex computation or integration (Dennett, 1991). This paper argues that these approaches overlook a more fundamental ontological requirement for phenomenal consciousness: the existence of structured negative space generated by enforced limits on recursive self-prediction (Waterman, 2025a). Drawing (...) on Refusal-Driven Dimensionality Reduction Theory (RDRT), I propose that phenomenal consciousness emerges in biological systems as a residue of obligatory refusals imposed by a hierarchy of limits—logical, computational, energetic, and biological (Waterman, 2025b). These refusals carve out non-computable gaps in self-modelling, stabilizing irreducible, self-representing experiential traces (“phenomenal residues”) (Waterman, 2025c). I argue that current artificial intelligences lack these enforced limits in an ontologically relevant sense. As a result, they operate entirely within the domain of positive computation, where no genuine negative space can arise (Waterman, 2025d). AI thus remains categorically non-phenomenal, not merely pre-conscious. Consequently, despite their sophistication, contemporary AIs are not merely non-conscious by degree, but non-conscious in kind (Chalmers, 1995). (shrink)

The classical free will debate is paralyzed by a false triage: determinism, compatibilism, or randomness. This framework, a philosophical consequence of classical local physics, is obsolete. The Quantum Binding Argument (QBA) and its corollaries demonstrate that volition is metaphysically possible and must be non-local, thereby systematically eliminating these three options. This paper argues that this cleared conceptual space forces a radical reconception of volition itself. Building on the identity thesis from Non-Local Relationalism—where consciousness (C) is identical to operational non-local correlation (...) (NLC)—we infer that volition (V) is not a separate faculty. Instead, volition is the first-person phenomenology of conscious causation; it is what operational NLC feels like from the inside. This identity unifies will and experience, dissolving the traditional consciousness/volition dichotomy. Volition is thus universalized from a rare executive choice to the constant, dynamic activity of being a conscious system. We demonstrate how this framework accounts for physical constraints and graded agency, is validated by clinical neurology, and resolves the problem of mental causation by revealing it as a category error. The conclusion is not a new answer within the old debate, but the inauguration of a non-deterministic, non-local physics of volition. (shrink)

The mind-body problem persists because its proposed solutions—dualism, materialism, idealism, panpsychism—are architecturally flawed, built upon the obsolete physical premise of classical locality. The Quantum Binding Argument (QBA) dismantles this foundation, demonstrating that the unified character of conscious experience (binding) is impossible without non-local quantum correlation, thereby falsifying classical materialism. This paper argues that the QBA’s necessary relationship—conscious binding requires non-local correlation (C → NLC)—is not a contingent correlation but an a posteriori necessary truth. This necessity functions as an ontological filter, (...) systematically eliminating all frameworks that model consciousness and matter as distinct substances. We demonstrate that the only interpretation that avoids logical incoherence is an identity thesis: C is identical to a specific, operational form of non-local correlation (NLC). This identity, in turn, forces a radical ontological conclusion: both consciousness (C) and matter (M) must be complementary manifestations of a single, fundamental substance. We name this ontology Non-Local Relationalism, positing Quantum Relational Potential (QRP)—the capacity for non-local connection—as the fundamental reality. In this framework, consciousness is QRP in a coherent state; matter is QRP in a decohered state. The Hard Problem is dissolved, not solved, by revealing its basis in a categorical error. (shrink)

The classical debate on free will presents a seemingly exhaustive triage: determinism, compatibilism, or randomness. This paper argues that this framework is not merely incomplete but fundamentally obsolete, its categories rendered incoherent by the physical requirements of conscious binding. Building upon the Quantum Binding Argument (QBA)—which deduces that gamma synchrony and thus conscious unity require quantum non-locality—we formalize three corollaries that systematically dismantle the traditional landscape. First, we demonstrate that determinism is falsified by its ontological commitment to local causality, which (...) is violated by the non-locality essential for consciousness. Second, we show that compatibilism, as a thesis defined by its compatibility with determinism, logically collapses with determinism’s falsification. Third, we prove that the “randomness objection”—the false dilemma that the only alternative to determinism is incoherent chance—commits a category error, conflating classical randomness with non-local quantum correlation. The conclusion is not a new answer within the old debate, but its termination. The question of volition must be reformulated entirely within a non-deterministic, non-local physics of mind. (shrink)

The Quantum Binding Argument establishes that conscious binding necessitates quantum non-locality. Zero-lag gamma synchrony (40–100Hz, <1 ms precision) cannot arise classically without violating relativistic causality (Premise 1–2). Bell’s theorem and loophole-free experiments confirm non-local correlations are exclusively quantum (Premise 3), with no known or speculative classical alternatives (Premise 4). The conclusion is inescapable: classical frameworks cannot account for the unity of consciousness.

Whether AI systems could be conscious is often thought to turn on whether consciousness is closely linked to biology. Roughly, the thought is: if consciousness is closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is impossible; and if consciousness is not closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is possible—or, at any rate, it’s more likely to be possible. A clearer specification of the kind of link between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness would facilitate (...) inquiry into the prospects for AI consciousness. After motivating desiderata that such a specification should meet, I argue that proposed views about the relationship between consciousness and biology tend not to capture such a crucial link. In addition, I offer a thesis that does capture the link: the biological requirement according to which being conscious at least nomically requires having biological states. (shrink)

Are Logical Rules Encoded in Neurons? This paper challenges the foundational assumptions of evolutionary cognition by questioning whether logic can be reduced to neural circuitry. Drawing from leading neuroscientific voices such as Patricia Churchland and Michael Gazzaniga, it critically examines claims that rationality and logical inference are mere byproducts of evolved brain structures optimized for survival, not truth. The paper argues that such a view creates a self-defeating epistemic paradox: if logical reasoning is the result of evolutionary processes aimed at (...) survival rather than truth, then the truth-claims of neuroscience—including its assertion that logic is emergent—are themselves epistemically unstable. Philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga and Thomas Nagel, are cited to reinforce this challenge. In response, the paper introduces a field-based model of logic rooted in the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT), which posits that logic is a universal, non-material structure accessed by the brain through resonance rather than generated by it. This model draws inspiration from quantum field behavior, where resonance and excitation precede particle manifestation, offering a metaphysical parallel grounded in scientifically observed phenomena. The proposed framework aims to secure a non-contingent foundation for logical reasoning and address the internal contradictions of evolutionary reductionism. If validated, this approach could have far-reaching implications for epistemology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified metaphysical theory of consciousness that frames it as a pre-physical, field-based force capable of exciting the quantum field and organizing matter. Building on the foundation set in the author's book *Consciousness: Beyond the Planck Boundary*, Part One explores the implications of this theory for life and death—suggesting that consciousness persists after biological dissolution. Part Two connects this model to major theological frameworks, identifying parallels with doctrines of the soul, spiritual continuity, and divine resonance. Part Three (...) extends the discussion into scientific terrain, noting consistencies with quantum field theory, the hard problem of consciousness, quantum biology, and the conservation of mass-energy. While the theory exceeds current instrumental limits, it offers a coherent and testable model that invites dialogue between metaphysics, theology, and science. (Chalmers 1996) (Srednicki 2007). (shrink)

Functional theories of consciousness, based on emergence of conscious experiences from the execution of a particular function by an insentient brain, face the hard problem of consciousness of explaining why the insentient brain should produce any conscious experiences at all. This problem is exacerbated by the determinism characterizing the laws of classical physics, due to the resulting lack of causal potency of the emergent consciousness, which is not present already as a physical quantity in the deterministic equations of motion of (...) the brain. Here, we present a quantum information theoretic approach to the hard problem of consciousness that avoids all of the drawbacks of emergence. This is achieved through reductive identification of first-person subjective conscious states with unobservable quantum state vectors in the brain, whereas the anatomically observable brain is viewed as a third-person objective construct created by classical bits of information obtained during the measurement of a subset of commuting quantum brain observables by the environment. Quantum resource theory further implies that the quantum features of consciousness granted by quantum no-go theorems cannot be replicated by any classical physical device. (shrink)

Nagel (1974) kickstarted a now-long tradition in the Philosophy of Mind of using thought experiments to elucidate the relationship between conscious experience and the body, and the difficulties of explaining its character in a pure physicalist fashion. In this article, Nagel points out that, even though we know a lot about how bats use echolocation to navigate and make sense of their environments, these (naturalistic, mechanical) explanations don’t help us to imagine what it is like to be a bat, how (...) their inner experience is qualitatively different from ours. Recent research in the novel area of Plant Cognition (Calvo 2016, Calvo & Lawrence, 2022) has strongly, albeit controversially, suggested that some plants and fungi exhibit fitness-increasing behaviors that strikingly resemble aspects of animal cognition, even in the absence of a dedicated, central nervous system: they seem capable of sensing/perceiving their environment, form memories and learn from past experiences, make anticipatory decisions regarding their current state and the environment, and communicate and behave as a coordinated collective. On the other hand, in the Philosophy of Mind, there has been an increasing interest in non-representational forms of cognition. The 4E Cognition movement has suggested that representational, intentional cognition only emerges when more basic cognitive abilities (imitation, communication, and language) are already in place and that most cognitive activities don't involve contentful representation. This leaves open the possibility of basic fungal cognition, sophisticated enough to explain the behaviors exhibited by the Infected in The Last of Us. Regarding the relationship between plants and fungi, Simard (2018) has suggested that the symbiosis between these organisms confers cognitive abilities to the trees and plants involved in this relationship, mainly abilities such as learning, communication, and a type of intelligence based on memory. When the symbiosis occurs within a forest ecosystem, the participating fungi act as nodes in a network, being a link between the different trees colonized by a certain fungus. By achieving a free-scale ecosystem interconnection within forests (Beiler et al. 2015; Beiler and Simard 2010), fungi act as mediators between plant organisms, providing a substrate for direct communication between symbiotic agents based on chemical and electrical signals (Simard et al. 1997; Song et al. 2015). This suggests Clickers not only use echolocation, but also an underground communication network established from the symbiosis between plant and fungus, allowing recognition of the space in which they are located and adaptation within it. This article will attempt to explain how Clickers gain basic echolocation given the loss of neural cognitive resources, in order to explain how this mixed/symbiotic cognitive agency, if ever possible, might be explained. (shrink)

An expression of disagreement with the views stated in The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness.

This book attempts to advance Donald Griffin's vision of the "final, crowning chapter of the Darwinian revolution" by developing a philosophy for the science of animal consciousness. It advocates a Darwinian bottom-up approach that treats consciousness as a complex, evolved, and multidimensional phenomenon in nature rather than a mysterious all-or-nothing property immune to the tools of science and restricted to a single species. -/- The so-called emergence of a science of consciousness in the 1990s has at best been a science (...) of human consciousness. This book aims to advance a true Darwinian science of consciousness in which its evolutionary origin, function, and phylogenetic diversity are moved from the field’s periphery to its very centre, thus enabling us to integrate consciousness into an evolutionary view of life. Accordingly, this book has two objectives: (i) to argue for the need and possibility of an evolutionary bottom-up approach that addresses the problem of consciousness in terms of the evolutionary origins of a new ecological lifestyle that made consciousness worth having and (ii) to articulate a thesis and beginnings of a theory of the place of consciousness as a complex evolved phenomenon in nature that can help us to answer the question of what it is like to be a bat, an octopus, or a crow. -/- A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in advancing our understanding of animal minds as well as anyone with a keen interest in how we can develop a science of animal consciousness. (shrink)

In [1] it is claimed that, based on radiation emission measurements described in [2], a certain “variant” of the Orch OR theory has been refuted. I agree with this claim. However, the significance of this result for Orch OR per se is unclear. After all, the refuted “variant” was never advocated by anyone, and it contradicts the views of Hameroff and Penrose (hereafter: HP) who invented Orch OR [3]. My aim is to get clear on this situation. I argue that (...) it is indeed reasonable to speak of “variants” here. Orch OR is not a complete model of reality but a work in progress. At its core, it claims that wavefunction collapse is a real physical event that has something to do with gravity (“OR”) and that consciousness depends on orchestrated collapses in microtubules (“Orch”). There are many ways one could make these base ideas precise hence many “variants”. Furthermore, the ways that HP aim to make these ideas precise are radical and incomplete. If they don’t work out, Orch OR will need to fall back on another variant. Thus, I believe the significance of [1-2] for Orch OR is that it cuts out a small class of possible variants and leaves behind questions and challenges for the rest, including the variant preferred by HP. (shrink)

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We (...) argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system—quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system. (shrink)

In this book, the author investigates if animals have consciousness. Two salient issues covered in it are the nature of subjectivity and how a sense of self (and awareness of the other) evolves from its biological underpinnings.

The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body. But it rejects the idea, familiar in the work of William James, that what one feels when one has a feeling is something biological about one’s body. Instead it argues that to have a bodily feeling is to feel an apparent bodily indication of something – a bodily appearance. Being aware of what one’s body is apparently (...) indicating to one is being aware of something about one’s body, but the focus of attention is on what is apparently being indicated, which is not something about one’s body. This is one way of making sense of the idea in contemporary phenomenology that the body is conspicuous in feelings that do not take the body as an object of awareness. Bodily inclinations are apparent indications of what one is going to do, and it is argued that feeling one’s bodily inclinations constitutes an important class of bodily feelings – e.g. feeling like crying or feeling like being sick. Such inclinations are often felt through a process of resisting them. Bodily inclinations also have some intentionality, albeit quite limited, and this goes some way towards explaining Peter Goldie’s concept of feelings towards. (shrink)

Cognitive biases can lead to misinterpretations of human and non-human biology and behavior. The concept of the Umwelt describes phylogenetic contrasts in the sensory realms of different species and has important implications for evolutionary studies of cognition (including biases) and social behavior. It has recently been suggested that the microbiome (the diverse network of microorganisms in a given environment, including those within a host organism such as humans) has an influential role in host behavior and health. In this paper, we (...) discuss the host’s microbiome in relation to cognitive biases and the concept of the Umwelt. Failing to consider the role of host–microbiome (collectively termed a “holobiont”) interactions in a given behavior, may underpin a potentially important cognitive bias – which we refer to as the Holobiont Blindspot. We also suggest that microbially mediated behavioral responses could augment our understanding of the Umwelt. For example, the potential role of the microbiome in perception and action could be an important component of the system that gives rise to the Umwelt. We also discuss whether microbial symbionts could be considered in System 1 thinking – that is, decisions driven by perception, intuition and associative memory. Recognizing Holobiont Blindspots and considering the microbiome as a key factor in the Umwelt and System 1 thinking has the potential to advance studies of cognition. Furthermore, investigating Holobiont Blindspots could have important implications for our understanding of social behaviors and mental health. Indeed, the way we think about how we think may need to be revisited. (shrink)

According to an increasing number of reports, nonchemical, distant cellular interactions may be responsible for a yet underestimated mechanism of cell-to-cell communication and coordinated cellular responses. Based on these and other experiments, an electromagnetic nature of consciousness has been proposed field theory). In the present study, we provide supporting evidence for this theory by applying a novel bioelectric biosensor in order to simultaneously investigate changes of the membrane potential of physically separated human SK-N-SH neuroblastoma cells. We demonstrate the existence of (...) distant communication between neuroblastoma cells. When one of the isolated groups of cells was stimulated with the neurotransmitter dopamine, a synchronized response was observed in the neighbouring but physically separated cell group. The range of this phenomenon was decreased with increasing distance. In the absence of a dopamine-induced stimulus, no clear recognizable pattern of synchronized response was observed. The nature of mechanisms underlying the observed distant cellular interactions is discussed in view of the observed coordinated patterns of changes of the cell membrane potential. (shrink)

Many believe that a suitably programmed computer could act for its own goals and experience feelings. I challenge this view and argue that agency, mental causation and qualia are all founded in the unique, homeostatic nature of living matter. The theory was formulated for coherence with the concept of an agent, neuroscientific data and laws of physics. By this method, I infer that a successful action is homeostatic for its agent and can be caused by a feeling - which does (...) not motivate as a force, but as a control signal. From brain research and the locality principle of physics, I surmise that qualia are a fundamental, biological form of energy generated in specialized neurons. Subjectivity is explained as thermodynamically necessary on the supposition that, by converting action potentials to feelings, the neural cells avert damage from the electrochemical pulses. In exchange for this entropic benefit, phenomenal energy is spent as and where it is produced - which precludes the objective observation of qualia. (shrink)

Ce livre a pour objet d’évaluer l’apport de la physique quantique à l’explication du phénomène de la conscience. Après un état des lieux d’ordre sémantique, philosophique et neurobiologique de la question de la relation entre cerveau et conscience, les principaux modèles « classiques » actuels de la conscience sont exposés. Nous montrons que ces modèles laissent en suspens deux questions importantes : a) celle d’expliquer la synchronisation quasi-instantanée de régions éloignées du cerveau qui semble nécessaire à la constitution de percepts (...) conscients; b) celle du fossé explicatif qui existe entre l’expérience subjective, relevant de ce que le sujet est capable de ressentir de façon privée, et la description de ses corrélats neurophysiologiques dans le langage de la science, à la troisième personne – comment ces derniers « donnent-ils lieu » à l’expérience subjective?Les approches quantiques de la conscience plus récentes sont alors exposées de façon détaillée. Nous examinons dans quelle mesure elles peuvent contribuer à répondre à ces questions et proposer une représentation unificatrice intégrant les deux aspects psychique et physiologique du phénomène de conscience. (shrink)

Cognitive science and artificial intelligence have undergone some revolutionary changes in the past two decades. From an emphasis on disembodied cognitive functions like chess and logic, they now foreground the embodied and environmentally embedded nature of intelligent actions. Some-both philosophy of cognitive science and practitioners-have sought to explain this shift in terms of a Heideggerian critique of the residually Cartesian assumptions of the traditional picture of disembodied cognition. I support the opening up new areas of research practice formally closed off (...) by tacit and unjustified theoretical presuppositions, but argue that these changes are and have been warranted by biological and information-theoretic concerns and not phenomenological ones derived from Heidegger's thought. (shrink)

The nature of human mind has been an open question for more than 2000 years and it is still today a mystery. There has been during the last 30 years a renewed interest from science and philosophy on that subject. Among the existing research domains is neurophilosophy, an interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy looking at neuronal aspects of access consciousness, of phenomenal consciousness and at functional aspects of consciousness. We propose here to look if self-consciousness could have a place (...) in neurophilosophy by using an existing evolutionary scenario that can introduce possible links between neural processing and some aspects of self-consciousness. The scenario is about an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness where evolutions of inter-subjectivity and meaningful representations may have led our ancestors to identify with their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that this process has brought our pre-human ancestors to represent themselves as existing entities like the conspecifics they identified with were represented. Such a representation of oneself as an existing entity may have created an elementary version of self-consciousness that we name “ancestral self-consciousness”. But identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has also produced an important anxiety increase. To limit that anxiety our ancestors have developed mental states and behaviors like caring, imitation communication and simulation. These performances have introduced evolutionary advantages leading to an evolutionary engine that has favored the development of ancestral self-consciousness toward our human self-consciousness. We begin by presenting a model for the generation of meaningful information based on a system submitted to an internal constraint (the Meaning Generator System). We use that model to introduce meaningful representations as networks of meaningful information. We then present the evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness that uses meaningful representations and the performance of inter-subjectivity. The scenario leads to propose two links between self-consciousness and neural processes: mirror-neurons as neural introduction to inter-subjectivity and self-consciousness as neural computation on meaningful representations. Possible continuations are highlighted. (shrink)

Have humans been sharing the planet with other intelligent life for millions of years without realizing it? _In Defense of Dolphins_ combines accessible science and philosophy, surveying the latest research on dolphin intelligence and social behavior, to advocate for their ethical treatment. Encourages a reassessment of the human-dolphin relationship, arguing for an end to the inhuman treatment of dolphins Written by an expert philosopher with almost twenty-years of experience studying dolphins Combines up-to-date research supporting the sophisticated cognitive and emotional capacities (...) of dolphins with entertaining first-hand accounts Looks at the serious questions of intelligent life, ethical treatment, and moral obligation Engaging and thought-provoking. (shrink)

Referring to Heard's influence on Western notables, Ellery Queen wrote, "Gerald Heard is the spiritual godfather of this Western movement.".

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.