Bayesian Epistemology

In Sven Ove Hansson & Vincent F. Hendricks, Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 431-442 (2012)
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Abstract

Bayesian epistemology provides a formal framework within which concepts in traditional epistemology, in particular concepts relating to the justification of our beliefs, can be given precise definitions in terms of probability. The Bayesian approach has contributed clarity and precision to a number of traditional issues. A salient example is the recent embedding of the so-called coherentist theory of epistemic justification in a Bayesian framework shedding light on the relation between coherence and truth as well as on the concept of coherence itself. Starting with the early work of Condorcet, the calculus of probability has proved to be a useful tool in the study of social aspects of knowledge as it is pursued in social epistemology.

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reprint Olsson, Erik J. (2018) "Bayesian Epistemology". In Hansson, Sven Ove, Hendricks, Vincent F., Introduction to Formal Philosophy, pp. 431-442: Imprint: Springer (2018)

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Erik J. Olsson
Lund University

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References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1946 - La Salle, IL, USA: Open Court.
Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
Is coherence truth conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.

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