Abstract.
There has been much discussion of the relative merits of selling government bonds using a uniform-price auction rather than the traditional discriminatory-price auction. Arguments in favor of the former have won the day in respect of the newly instituted auctions of index-linked bonds in the USA and UK. This short paper assesses the evidence and concludes that the advantages of uniform-price auctions have been oversold.
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Received: 28 May 1999 / Accepted: 27 September 1999
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Binmore, K., Swierzbinski, J. Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?. Rev Econ Design 5, 387–410 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000026
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000026
