The Arbitration Digest

📢 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗧𝗲𝗮𝗺 | 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐃𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐬𝐭 The Arbitration Digest is inviting law students from recognised Indian universities to join our Content Team. 🔍 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐲𝐨𝐮 𝐝𝐨? > Summarise recent and landmark judgments from Indian and foreign jurisdictions > Contribute concise and insightful case notes for our LinkedIn handle > Other project work as per our requirements 📝 𝐒𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐚 Applicants will be shortlisted based on a case brief of: 𝐆𝐀𝐘𝐀𝐓𝐑𝐈 𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐀𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐘 𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐒𝐔𝐒 𝐌/𝐒. 𝐈𝐒𝐆 𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐀𝐒𝐎𝐅𝐓 𝐓𝐄𝐂𝐇𝐍𝐎𝐋𝐎𝐆𝐈𝐄𝐒 𝐋𝐈𝐌𝐈𝐓𝐄𝐃 [2025 INSC 605] Note: Please follow the format of the case brief posted on our LinkedIn handle. 🔗 Find the judgment here: https://lnkd.in/gnb2BAWN 📅 𝐀𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐃𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞: 27th September 2026 📌 𝐀𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐲 𝐯𝐢𝐚: careerswithtad@gmail.com 📩 Interested? Apply now and be part of The Arbitration Digest. In case of any queries, email us at careerswithtad@gmail.com. #LawStudents #LegalWriting #CaseLaw #Arbitration #TheArbitrationDigest

📢 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗧𝗲𝗮𝗺 | 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐃𝐢𝐠𝐞𝐬𝐭 The Arbitration Digest is inviting law students from recognised Indian universities to join our Content Team. 🔍 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐲𝐨𝐮 𝐝𝐨? > Summarise recent and landmark judgments from Indian and foreign jurisdictions > Contribute concise and insightful case notes for our LinkedIn handle > Other project work as per our requirements 📝 𝐒𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐚 Applicants will be shortlisted based on a case brief of: 𝐆𝐀𝐘𝐀𝐓𝐑𝐈 𝐁𝐀𝐋𝐀𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐘 𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐒𝐔𝐒 𝐌/𝐒. 𝐈𝐒𝐆 𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐀𝐒𝐎𝐅𝐓 𝐓𝐄𝐂𝐇𝐍𝐎𝐋𝐎𝐆𝐈𝐄𝐒 𝐋𝐈𝐌𝐈𝐓𝐄𝐃 [2025 INSC 605] Note: Please follow the format of the case brief posted on our LinkedIn handle. 🔗 Find the judgment here: https://lnkd.in/gnb2BAWN 📅 𝐀𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐃𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞: 27th September 2026 📌 𝐀𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐲 𝐯𝐢𝐚: careerswithtad@gmail.com 📩 Interested? Apply now and be part of The Arbitration Digest. In case of any queries, email us at careerswithtad@gmail.com. #LawStudents #LegalWriting #CaseLaw #Arbitration #TheArbitrationDigest

𝐂𝐚𝐧 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐛𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐧 𝐚 𝐬𝐞𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧? The answer may seem straightforward. But the Delhi High Court’s recent decision in JPC Infrastructure & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Alstom Transport India Ltd. raises an important question about the relationship between arbitral confidentiality and evidentiary admissibility. The dispute concerned a letter originating from separate arbitral proceedings between Alstom and DFCCIL. JPC sought to rely upon the letter in its own arbitration against Alstom, contending that it contained admissions relevant to its claims. The Arbitral Tribunal declined to rely upon the document, finding that its use would be inconsistent with the confidentiality obligations under Section 42A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Delhi High Court upheld this approach. But the judgment raises a larger doctrinal question: does Section 42A merely impose an obligation of confidentiality, or can its breach have evidentiary consequences as well? This case opinion examines the Court’s interpretation of Section 42A, the significance of its non-obstante clause, and whether a document sourced from confidential arbitral proceedings can be introduced as evidence in another proceeding merely because it is otherwise relevant. More importantly, it explores the tension between confidentiality and admissibility, the limits of institutional rules such as the ICC Rules, and the extent to which a Section 34 court can interfere with an arbitral tribunal’s evidentiary determination. The judgment ultimately reinforces an important proposition: arbitral confidentiality cannot be rendered illusory merely because the material may have evidentiary value in another proceeding. A contribution by Shubham Kumar Sinha and Aniruddh Kamath Read the full case opinion here: https://lnkd.in/gFRA9gE9 #Arbitration #ArbitrationLaw #Section42A #Confidentiality #Evidence #DelhiHighCourt #JPCInfrastructure #Alstom #Section34 #DisputeResolution #CommercialLaw #LegalResearch

𝐂𝐚𝐧 𝐚 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫 𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭? The answer may appear counterintuitive. Yet, the Supreme Court’s decisions from 𝐵ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑 to the recent 𝐵ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, alongside the Delhi High Court’s decisions in 𝑀𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑑 𝐺𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑎, 𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑆, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑟ℎ, have increasingly clarified that the right to object is not lost merely because the objecting party was itself responsible for the appointment. This blog examines the tension between the statutory protection under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the possibility of strategic conduct by a party that knowingly participates before an allegedly ineligible tribunal and raises the objection only after an adverse award. More importantly, it explores whether the strict requirement of an “express written waiver” should operate identically even where the appointing party itself created the situation it later seeks to challenge. The article analyses the concerns of strategic delay, the “miscreant party” problem recognised in Bhadra International, and the “heads I win, tails the arbitration is void” incentive that may arise from the present framework. Moving beyond waiver by conduct, the article proposes a more nuanced, fact-specific approach, one that preserves the mandatory nature of Section 12(5), while allowing courts to examine knowledge of the defect, written representations, participation, timing of the objection, and whether the challenge followed an adverse outcome. The central question is therefore not merely whether an appointing party can become an objector, but whether the law can protect tribunal independence without inadvertently rewarding strategic silence. A contribution by Aahana Singh Read the full blog here: https://lnkd.in/gmQW-ci5 #Arbitration #ArbitrationLaw #Section12 #UnilateralAppointment #BharatBroadband #BhadraInternational #DelhiHighCourt #ArbitrationAndConciliationAct #DisputeResolution #LegalResearch

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐜𝐚𝐧 𝐛𝐞 𝐬𝐞𝐭 𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐒.34 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐜𝐭, 1996, 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐡𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐛𝐢𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤 𝐨𝐟 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐨𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬. Tarapore & Company v. M/s National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: In 1988, the Respondent (NTPC) awarded a construction contract to the Petitioner (Tarapore) for an Ash Bund structure. The relationship eventually deteriorated, leading to a legal dispute. Pursuant to the arbitration clause, the disputes were referred to arbitration. In 2008, the arbitral tribunal rendered its award, partly allowing the claims of both parties, though several substantial counterclaims were decided in favour of NTPC. Following this, the parties filed petitions under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act), to challenge the award, with the court noting that even though the disputes arose earlier, the Act’s framework applied to the challenges. Tarapore argued that the arbitrator wrongly rejected or only partially allowed several of its claims, including claims for unpaid work, escalation, damages, prolongation costs, and interest. Additionally, counterclaims relating to mobilisation advance and risk-and-cost execution, which were allowed in favour of NTPC, were unsupported by evidence and barred by limitation. Conversely, NTPC argued that the arbitrator had erroneously granted several claims to Tarapore despite contractual provisions excluding such reliefs. It further stated that many findings lacked reasons and failed to properly assess its counterclaims. 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Delhi High Court held that the award was liable to be set aside independently on multiple grounds, i.e, reasonable apprehension of bias, failure to comply with S.31(3) of the Act, and patent illegality arising from findings contrary to the contract. The Court held that appointing a serving NTPC General Manager gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, compromising the fundamental requirement of arbitral impartiality despite permissions for employee-arbitrators. Furthermore, under S.31(3), the award failed the mandate of being "intelligible, proper, and adequate" as the award must demonstrate a rational link between the material on record and the conclusions reached. The Court held that awarding 50% of the escalation claims on vague 'equitable grounds', contrary to the contractual price adjustment mechanism, amounted to unauthorised ex aequo et bono adjudication and rendered the award patently illegal. 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Prasha Bhatia 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://lnkd.in/dPW_2-Jk 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬:  𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2026 DHC 4203 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 12.05.2026 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Delhi High Court 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: Jasmeet Singh, J.

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐰𝐢𝐬𝐝𝐨𝐦 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐢𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐈𝐁𝐂 𝐢𝐬 𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐢𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐞 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐣𝐮𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐲. M/s. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: The Petitioner and the Respondent entered into an Agreement to Sell for property which included Rs. 1.2 crores towards a proposed One-Time Settlement (OTS) to a Bank and a further sum of money to the seller-Respondents. However, the sellers sought to resile from the Agreement on the ground that the proposed OTS had not been accepted by the Bank. The petitioner sued the seller-respondents for specific performance and interim injunction in respect of the suit property. The Trial Court granted interim protection, which was set aside by the Appellate Court and then the High Court, holding that the performance of the Agreement was contingent upon the acceptance of the OTS by the Bank. Thereafter, Petitioner’s SLP was also dismissed and thus aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking recall of the order dismissing SLP on the ground of subsequent developments, including a later OTS and withdrawal of corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) u/s. 12A of the IBC, which was not disclosed earlier. On the other hand, Respondents argued that MA is not maintainable and that OTS has already been acted upon. 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Supreme Court dismissed the MA, holding it to be devoid of merit and legally non-maintainable. The Court held that the commercial wisdom of the majority of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) determines, through negotiations and assessment of viability, how and in what manner the CIRP is to proceed. More particularly, the Court observed that the adjudicating authority cannot make any inquiry beyond the limited statutory parameters, nor can it issue directions with respect to the exercise of commercial wisdom of the CoC, whether in approving, rejecting, or otherwise dealing with a proposal.  The Court held that once withdrawal under S.12A is approved by the CoC, judicial interference is limited, and their commercial decision ordinarily cannot be displaced by adjudicating or appellate authorities. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the commercial wisdom of the CoC is largely non-justiciable and cannot ordinarily be substituted by adjudicating or appellate authorities. 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Shashi Shekhar 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://lnkd.in/dTAs_DfZ 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬:  𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2026 INSC 275 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 23.03.2026 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Supreme Court of India 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: Vikram Nath, J., Sandeep Mehta, J. #Insolvency #CaseLaw #TAD #SupremeCourtofIndia #CoC

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫, 𝐝𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐞 𝐚𝐧 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐝𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐚 𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐜𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐰𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐞𝐫 𝐣𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭𝐬. J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders India Pvt. Ltd. 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: The Appellant engaged the Respondent as a contractor for execution of four road infrastructure projects in J&K. Disputes arose regarding certain contractual claims and the Respondent invoked the arbitration. Following the appointment of a sole arbitrator, the arbitral tribunal fixed Srinagar as the seat and New Delhi as the venue with the consent of the parties. Subsequently, the arbitral award was rendered at New Delhi. The Appellant filed a petition u/S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) before the High Court at Srinagar. The Respondent raised a territorial jurisdiction objection, and the High Court returned the petition, holding that courts at New Delhi alone possessed the jurisdiction since the award was rendered there. Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.     Appellant contended that the arbitrator designated Srinagar as the seat, alterable only by mutual agreement. Also, where seat & venue differ, the seat determines the supervisory jurisdiction and thus, the courts at Srinagar alone possess the jurisdiction u/S.34 of the Act. Per contra, the Respondent argued that the award recorded New Delhi as the place of arbitration for all intents and purposes, and parties may alter seats by agreement. 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Supreme Court held that the seat of arbitration constitutes the juridical home of the arbitration and operates akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, vesting supervisory jurisdiction exclusively in the courts of the seat, irrespective of where hearings were held or cause of action arose. The venue is merely a geographical convenience and does not confer jurisdiction, nor can a stray recital in the award alter an expressly designated seat. In the present case, Srinagar was expressly designated as the seat by consent of the parties, further reinforced by the ‘closest and most intimate connection’ test. The mere fact that the tribunal conducted hearings or rendered the award at New Delhi for convenience did not alter the juridical seat. To hold otherwise would render the concept of seat otiose and undermine party autonomy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s impugned order, and restored the S.34 petition before the High Court at Srinagar for decision on the merits. 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Aparna Upadhyay 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://clik.now/PJqb 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬:  𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2026 INSC 368 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 15.05.2026 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Supreme Court of India 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: P.S. Narasimha, J., Alok Aradhe, J.

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐧 𝐎𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐨 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐚 𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐎𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐬 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐔𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐒. 34 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐜𝐭, 1996. U.P. Infraestate P. Ltd. through Liquidator De Vinder Arora v. Rivaj Infratech Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: A sole Arbitrator terminated arbitral proceedings under S.25 of the Arbitration and Conciliation, 1996 (the Act) on account of the appellant's non-cooperation in filing its statement of claim. The appellant's application for recall of the termination order was dismissed by the Arbitrator. Instead of invoking the remedy under S. 14(2) of the Act, the appellant challenged the refusal order by filing a petition under S.34, which was dismissed. The present appeal was filed under S. 37. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the S. 34 petition was itself unmaintainable, relying on Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, which mandates that dismissal of a recall application must be challenged under S.14(2). The appellant argued that the Arbitrator's refusal to recall the termination order effectively constituted a fresh termination under S.25, rendering it challengeable under S.34. It also contended that Harshbir Singh Pannu should operate prospectively. 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Delhi High Court held that the appeal under S.37 was maintainable because the Single Judge had formally decided the matter under S.34. Relying on Harshbir Singh Pannu, the Court held that a dismissal of a recall application by the Arbitrator must be challenged under S.14(2), not S.34. However, it held the S.34 petition unmaintainable. The Court further held that Harshbir Singh Pannu operates retrospectively, as the Supreme Court did not expressly make the decision prospective; the declaration of law applied retrospectively to all pending matters. The Court emphasized that arbitration proceedings can be terminated only once; a refusal to recall is not a fresh termination order. The impugned Single Judge order was quashed, with liberty to the appellant to pursue remedies under S.14(2). 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Anushka Singh 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://lnkd.in/dvtQraHA 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬:  𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2026:DHC:3550-DB 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 24.05.2026 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Delhi High Court 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: B. Bhattacharjee, J. #Arbitration #Section14 #Section34 #TAD

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐧 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐓𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐜𝐚𝐧 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐏𝐫𝐞-𝐀𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝, 𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞 𝐋𝐢𝐭𝐞 & 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭-𝐀𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐰𝐡𝐞𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐡𝐢𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐢𝐭.   Union of India & Ors. (Appellants) v. Larsen and Toubro Limited (Respondent)   𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: The dispute arose from a 2011 contract between the Appellants and Respondent for modernization work at Jhansi Workshop. The project faced significant delays (about 40 months), leading to disputes over payments and compensation. The contract contained clauses prohibiting payment of interest on amounts payable under the contract. The Respondent initiated arbitration whereupon the Arbitral Tribunal awarded approximately ₹5.53 crore, including amounts that effectively contained interest components. It also granted post-award interest at 12% in case of delay. Appellants challenged the award under S.34 and S.37 of the A&C Act, 1996, but both the Commercial Court at Jhansi and Allahabad High Court upheld the award. The Appellants argued that the Tribunal had violated the express contractual bar on interest by awarding it in the guise of compensation. They contended that under S.31(7)(a) of the A&C Act, arbitral tribunals are bound by the contract, and once interest is barred, it cannot be granted under any label. Conversely, the Respondent, put forth that the clause should be narrowly interpreted, that some claims were admitted dues not hit by the bar, and that compensation for delayed payment was justified. It also maintained that post-award interest is statutory under S. 31(7)(b).   𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Hon’ble Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal. It held that the contractual clauses clearly barred payment of interest on all amounts payable under the contract, and this prohibition could not be circumvented by awarding interest as “compensation.” The Hon’ble Court observed that Tribunal had erred in granting pre-award and pendente lite interest, and the S.34 and S.37 courts failed to correct this. However, the Apex Court distinguished post-award interest, holding that it is governed by S. 31(7)(b) and is not subject to contractual exclusion unless expressly barred. Thus, the Court allowed the post-award interest, however, it modified the rate of interest to 8%.   𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Riana Mukherjee 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://lnkd.in/g2AqFDAd 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬   𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2026 INSC 203 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 27th February, 2026 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Supreme Court of India  𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: J. Sanjay Karol & J. Vipul M. Pancholi    #Arbitration #LegalUpdate #Contract #SupremeCourtofIndia #CaseLaw #Payment #ArbitralTribunal #PendenteLiteInterest #Delay #Barred #Prohibition #CourtJudgment #LegalPrecedent #CommercialLaw

𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐚𝐬 𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐨 𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐚 𝐩𝐞𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 9 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐜𝐭, 1996, 𝐝𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐞 𝐛𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐛𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐥𝐲 𝐧𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐌𝐨𝐔 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐫𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐮𝐬𝐞. Suraksha Salvia LLP (Appellant) v. The State of Meghalaya (Respondent) 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬: The Department of Health & Family Welfare (DH&FW), Government of Meghalaya, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Suraksha Speciality LLP in association with Salvia Global LLP (described as the ‘private party’) for establishing a diagnostic centre under a PPP model. The MoU contained an arbitration clause providing that disputes between “the parties” would be referred to arbitration under the A&C Act, 1996. Subsequently, disputes arose when the Government decided to terminate the MoU to facilitate establishment of a medical college. A termination notice dated 30.01.2025 was issued. The Appellant issued a notice under S.21 of the A&C Act and filed a petition under S.9 seeking interim protection against termination. The Commercial Court initially granted interim relief but later vacated the injunction holding that Suraksha Salvia LLP was not a party to the MoU. The present appeal challenged that finding. 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬: The Hon’ble Meghalaya High Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the application filed by the Appellant under S.9 was not maintainable. It reiterated that interim relief under Section 9 is available only to a “party” to an arbitration agreement. On a reading of the MoU, the Court held that it was executed between DH&FW and Suraksha Speciality LLP in association with Salvia Global LLP. The Appellant entity was found not to be in existence on the execution date, having been incorporated later and was therefore, held not to be a party to the present agreement. The Hon’ble Court also noted that the possibility of non-signatories being bound under the Group of Companies doctrine required the intention of a non-signatory to be bound by an agreement. As the Appellant LLP was non-existent at contract formation, no such intent could be inferred, rendering the doctrine inapplicable. The Appellant was held not to be a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore not entitled to maintain the S.9 petition. 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐬: Adv. Priyanka Barik 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐤 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: https://lnkd.in/gJqQCdSW 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬 𝐂𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 2025: MLHC: 1199-DB 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: 09.12.2025 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐭: Meghalaya High Court 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐚𝐦: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Soumen Sen, Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, Judge #Arbitration #NonSignatory #Section9 #TAD #ArbitrationDigest #MeghalayaHighCourt