The threats are getting faster. The defense has to keep up. Lockheed's new PAC-3 Edge is built to take on hypersonic and advanced missile threats. It builds on the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE, with a new seeker and more range and altitude. Missile defense is only as good as the interceptor. Good to see Lockheed bringing real hardware to AUSA, not just slides. Fight's On! #AUSA2026 #LockheedPartner #ad

NEW from United Fire: the MSA G1™ City Edition SCBA. Built with integrated LUNAR® Beacon Technology, the new G1 City Edition is designed to help crews locate firefighters faster during search-and-rescue operations while improving accountability on the fireground. It also integrates with the LUNAR search network, thermal imaging and MSA FireGrid® connectivity for greater situational awareness when it matters most. MultiVu United Fire is proud to now offer the MSA G1 City Edition SCBA. Contact us to learn more about this next generation of firefighter safety technology. #UnitedFire #MSASafety #G1CityEdition #SCBA #FirefighterSafety #SearchAndRescue #FireService

A GNSS signal rarely fails outright. It degrades quietly, and the receiver keeps reporting a position with the same confidence it had five minutes earlier. During my time in the Navy, I saw that exact scenario play out on a bridge navigation team, watching firsthand what electronic warfare does to those systems. The numbers looked fine, the crew trusted them, and the actual position was already off. Nobody had done anything wrong. Nobody had been told when to stop trusting the screen. That's the gap most resilience plans skip. They cover the failure mode — jamming, spoofing, outage — but not the decision mode: who has the authority to declare the input unreliable, and how that call gets made before the consequences do. A second receiver doesn't close that gap. If both systems can be spoofed the same way, redundancy just gives you two sources of false confidence instead of one. None of this gets sorted out at 02:00, with a vessel already off track and everyone looking at each other for an answer — or when a nation is deliberately signaling that it intends to take what isn't theirs. The threshold, the authority, and the fallback procedure need to be defined and rehearsed before that moment, not improvised during it. Trusting a navigation system less isn't caution. It's an operational decision, and someone specific should own it — decided ahead of time. #e-Navigation #GNSS #Spoofing #Hijacking #Ports #MatimeSafety #MaritimeEfficiency Picture source: https://lnkd.in/dq9TBkKy

The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has published MGN 719, Operating in GNSS Denied and Degraded Environments, recognising that GNSS disruption and loss are now part of the maritime operating environment. Jamming, spoofing and signal loss can affect far more than navigation. They may also impact AIS, ECDIS, VTS, AtoN, port systems, pilotage operations and networks that depend on GNSS timing. The risk is not always an obvious system failure. A system may continue operating while providing inaccurate information.This is why two GNSS receivers do not necessarily provide resilience. If both rely on the same compromised source, there is equipment redundancy, but no true functional independence. The MCA recommends identifying PNT dependencies, reviewing system architectures and data flows, using independent means of verification, and maintaining alternative navigation capabilities. This becomes increasingly important as maritime systems grow more digital and interconnected. Resilience starts with understanding dependencies and failure modes, not simply counting systems. #GNSS #PNT #MaritimeSafety #Resilience #Spoofing #Jamming #VTS #AIS #AtoN

The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) has published MGN 719, Operating in GNSS Denied and Degraded Environments, recognising that GNSS disruption and loss are now part of the maritime operating environment. Jamming, spoofing and signal loss can affect far more than navigation. They may also impact AIS, ECDIS, VTS, AtoN, port systems, pilotage operations and networks that depend on GNSS timing. The risk is not always an obvious system failure. A system may continue operating while providing inaccurate information.This is why two GNSS receivers do not necessarily provide resilience. If both rely on the same compromised source, there is equipment redundancy, but no true functional independence. The MCA recommends identifying PNT dependencies, reviewing system architectures and data flows, using independent means of verification, and maintaining alternative navigation capabilities. This becomes increasingly important as maritime systems grow more digital and interconnected. Resilience starts with understanding dependencies and failure modes, not simply counting systems. #GNSS #PNT #MaritimeSafety #Resilience #Spoofing #Jamming #VTS #AIS #AtoN

GNSS denial is no longer a theoretical navigation problem — it is becoming an operational DP risk. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency has issued MGN 719 (M+F): Operating in GNSS Denied and Degraded Environments, highlighting the growing impact of jamming, spoofing and loss of satellite-based positioning. For Dynamic Positioning operations, the message is especially important: Having multiple DGNSS units does not automatically mean true PRS diversity if they are all exposed to the same GNSS interference. The real focus should be on: • Independent position references • Cross-checking and position integrity • FMEA and ASOG considerations • Contingency planning for GNSS loss or spoofing • Stronger use of non-GNSS references where required A stable position is not always a trustworthy position. The future of DP is not only about maintaining position — it is about knowing when that position can be trusted. Official MCA guidance: MGN 719 (M+F) – Operating in GNSS Denied and Degraded Environments #DynamicPositioning #DPO #SDPO #GNSS #Spoofing #Jamming #PRS #FMEA #ASOG #DP2 #DP3 #MaritimeSafety

We present the Poseidon Physical Underwater Barrier, a modular, seafloor-reaching system with tamper sensors that integrates with surface barriers to close subsurface access gaps. Read the full analysis: https://wix.to/cZ5uejq #UnderwaterDefense #MaritimeSecurity

Bridger Aerospace is partnering with OroraTech USA to integrate space-based thermal intelligence into IGNIS, Bridger's wildfire operations platform used by state, federal, county, and municipal agencies. The goal: identify threats earlier, understand fire behavior, and put critical intelligence into the hands of crews and incident commanders before aircraft even reach the fire. During a recent pilot on the Grasshopper Fire near Oregon's Mount Hood, a Bridger Fire Behavior Analyst used a satellite-derived fire perimeter to feed a spread prediction model, delivering an accurate read on the fire's progression through the IGNIS platform. "We are closing the gap between space, air, and the fireline," says Thomas Grübler, Co-founder of OroraTech and CEO of OroraTech USA. 📖 Read more: https://ow.ly/9loQ50ZUznk #AerialFire #BridgerAerospace #OroraTech #WildfireDetection #IGNIS #AerialFirefighting #FireTechnology