Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Arguments for Incompatibilism" by Kadri Vihvelin

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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.

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Albert, David Z., 1992, Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pres.. (Scholar)
Alvarez, Maria, 2009, “Actions, Thought Experiments, and the ‘Principle of Alternate Possibilities’”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85(1): 61–81. doi:10.1080/00048400802215505 (Scholar)
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M., 1981, “Causality and Determination”, in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, (Collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, v. 2), Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press: 133–147. Originally her inaugural lecture at Cambridge University, 1971. (Scholar)
Armstrong, David, 1983, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Austin, J.L., 1956, “Ifs and Cans”, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 42: 109–132. doi:10.1093/019283021x.003.0009 (Scholar)
Ayer, A.J., 2009, “Freedom and Necessity”, in Pereboom 2009a: ch. 12. (Scholar)
Balaguer, Mark, 2010, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Beebee, Helen, 2000, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(3): 571–594. doi:10.2307/2653613 (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument”, The Philosophical Review, 111(2): 235–241. doi:10.1215/00318108-111-2-235 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Local Miracle Compatibilism”, Noûs, 37(2): 258–277. doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00438 (Scholar)
–––, 2013, Free Will: An Introduction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
Beebee, Helen and Alfred Mele, 2002, “Humean Compatibilism”, Mind, 111(442): 201–23. doi:10.1093/mind/111.442.201 (Scholar)
Bennett, Jonathan, 1984, “Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction”, The Philosophical Review, 93(1): 57–––91. doi:10.2307/2184413 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0199258872.001.0001 (Scholar)
Berofsky, Bernard, 2003, “Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet”, in Widerker & McKenna 2003: 107–126. (Scholar)
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–––, 2012, Nature’s Challenge to Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640010.001.0001 (Scholar)
Bok, Hilary, 1998, Freedom and Responsibility, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
Brand, Myles and Douglas Walton (eds.), 1976, Action Theory: Proceedings of the Winnipeg Conference on Human Action, held at Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, 9–11 May 1975, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
Campbell, Joseph Keim, 2005, “Compatibilist Alternatives”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(3): 387–406. doi:10.1080/00455091.2005.10716595 (Scholar)
–––, 2007, “Free Will and the Necessity of the Past”, Analysis, 67(2): 105–111. doi:10.1093/analys/67.2.105 (Scholar)
Campbell, Joseph Keim, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier (eds.), 2004,Freedom and Determinism, MIT Press: Bradford Books. (Scholar)
Campbell, Joseph Keim, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater (eds.), 2011, Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, (Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, v. 8), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.001.0001 (Scholar)
Capes, Justin A., 2012, “Action, Responsibility, and Ability to Do Otherwise”, Philosophical Studies, 158(1): 1–15. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5 (Scholar)
–––, 2019, “What the Consequence Argument is an Argument For”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8(1): 50–56. doi:10.1002/tht3.404 (Scholar)
Carlson, Erik, 2000, “Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity”, Noûs, 34(2): 277–290. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00211 (Scholar)
Carroll, John, 2008, “Nailed to Hume’s Cross?”, in Sider, Hawthorne, & Zimmerman 2008: 67–81. (Scholar)
Chisholm, Roderick M., 1964, “Human Freedom and the Self”, The Lindley Lectures, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas. Reprinted in Watson 2003: ch. 1 and Pereboom 2009a: ch. 14. (Scholar)
Clarke, Randolph, 1993, “Towards a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will”, Noûs, 27(2): 191–203. Reprinted in Watson 2003: ch. 14 and Russell & Deery 2013: ch. 11. doi:10.2307/2215755 (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 2005, “On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29: 13–24. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00103.x (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Abilities to Act”, Philosophy Compass, 10(12): 893–904. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12299 (Scholar)
Cross, Charles, 1986, “‘Can’ and the Logic of Ability”, Philosophical Studies, 50(1): 53–64. doi:10.1007/bf00355160 (Scholar)
Cutter, Brian, 2017, “What is the Consequence Argument an Argument For?”, Analysis, 77 (2): 278–287. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx052 (Scholar)
Darrow, Clarence, 1924, The Trial of Leopold and Loeb, Attorney for the Damned: Clarence Darrow in the Courtroom, Arthur Weinberg (ed.), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 16–86. (Scholar)
Deery, Oisin, 2015, “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 93(2): 319–334. doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.968596 (Scholar)
–––, 2015, “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will”, Philosophical Studies, 172(8): 2033–2054. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0396-7 (Scholar)
Deery, Oisin, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols, 2013, “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency” in D. Shoemaker 2013: 126–150. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.003.0006. (Scholar)
Deery, Oisin and Eddy Nahmias, 2017, “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood”, Philosophical Studies, 174(5): 1255–1276. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0754-8 (Scholar)
Dennett, Daniel, 1984, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, Freedom Evolves, New York: Viking Penguin. (Scholar)
Dorr, Cian, 2016, “Against Counterfactual Miracles”, The Philosophical Review, 125(2): 241–286. doi:10.1215/00318108-3453187 (Scholar)
Double, Richard, 1989, “Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons”, Philosophical Studies, 56(2): 163–173. Reprinted in Russell & Deery 2013: ch. 14. doi:10.1007/bf00355940 (Scholar)
Earman, John, 1986, A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Determinism: What We Have Learned and What We Still Don’t Know”, in Campbell, O’Rourke, & Shier 2004: 21–46. (Scholar)
Ekstrom, Laura, 2000, Free Will: A Philosophical Study, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Scholar)
Esfeld, Michael, 2021, “Super-Humeanism and Free Will”, Synthese, 198(7): 6245–6258. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02460-x (Scholar)
Fara, Michael, 2008, “Masked Abilities and Compatibilism”, Mind, 117(468): 843–865. doi:10.1093/mind/fzn078 (Scholar)
Feldman, Richard, 2004, “Freedom and Contextualism”, in Campbell, O’Rourke, & Shier 2004: 255–276. (Scholar)
Finch, Alicia, 2013, “On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action”, Philosophical Studies, 163(1): 151–170. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9791-5 (Scholar)
Finch, Alicia and Ted Warfield, 1998, “The MIND Argument and Libertarianism”, Mind, 107(427): 515–528. doi:10.1093/mind/107.427.515 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin, 1983, “Incompatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 43(1): 121–37. doi:10.1007/bf01112527 (Scholar)
–––, 1986, “Power Necessity”, Philosophical Topics, 14(2): 77–91. doi:10.5840/philtopics19861424 (Scholar)
–––, 1988, “Freedom and Miracles”, Noûs, 22(2): 235–252. doi:10.2307/2215861 (Scholar)
–––, 1994, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
–––, 2003, “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism”, in Watson 2003: ch. 10. (Scholar)
–––, 2004, “Responsibility and Manipulation”, The Journal of Ethics, 8(2): 145–77. doi:10.1023/b:joet.0000018773.97209.84 (Scholar)
–––, 2009, “Ultimacy and Alternative Possibilities”, Philosophical Studies, 144(1): 15–20. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9370-1 (Scholar)
–––, 2011, “The Zygote Argument Re-mixed”, Analysis, 71(2): 267–272. doi:10.1093/analys/anr008 (Scholar)
–––, 2021, “Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility”, Criminal Law and Philosophy 15: 255–270. doi:10.1007/s11572-021-09561-0 (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1998, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Fischer, John Martin and Patrick Todd, 2011, “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks”, The Philosophical Review, 120(1): 97–115. doi:10.1215/00318108-2010-025 (Scholar)
––– (eds.), 2015, Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Fatalism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Flint, Thomas P., 1987, “Compatibilism and the Argument from Unavoidability”, Journal of Philosophy, 74(8): 423–40. doi:10.2307/2027000 (Scholar)
Foley, Richard, 1979, “Compatibilism and Control over the Past”, Analysis, 39(2): 70–74. doi:10.1093/analys/39.2.70 (Scholar)
Frankfurt, Harry G., 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 66(23): 820–39. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988, Watson 2003: ch. 8, Pereboom 2009a: ch. 15, and Russell & Deery 2013: ch 7. doi:10.2307/2023833 (Scholar)
–––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy, 68(1): 5–20. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988, Watson 2003: ch. 16, Pereboom 2009a: ch. 16, and Russell & Deery 2013: ch. 13. doi:10.2307/2024717 (Scholar)
–––, 1988, The Importance of What we Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2002, “Reply to John Martin Fischer”, in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
Franklin, Christopher Evan, 2014, “Powers, Necessity, and Determinism”, Thought, 3(3): 225–229. doi:10.1002/tht3.139 (Scholar)
–––, 2016, “If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist”, Mind, 125(500): 1101–1131. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv177 (Scholar)
–––, 2018, A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Gallois, Andre, 1977, “Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism”, Philosophical Studies, 32(1): 99–105. doi:10.1007/bf00373718 (Scholar)
Ginet, Carl, 1966, “Might We Have No Choice?” in Lehrer 1966: 87–104. (Scholar)
–––, 1983, “In Defense of Incompatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 44(3): 391–400. (Scholar)
–––, 1990, On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 1996, “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 403–417. Reprinted in Widerker & McKenna 2003: 75–90. doi:10.2307/2216254 (Scholar)
Glick, David and Hannah Tierney, 2020, “Desperately Seeking Sourcehood”, Philosophical Studies, 177(4): 953–970. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1215-3 (Scholar)
Graham, Peter A, 2008, “A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, 140(1): 65–82. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9226-0 (Scholar)
Hall, Ned, 2000, “Causation and the Price of Transitivity”, Journal of Philosophy, 97(4): 198–222. doi:10.2307/2678390 (Scholar)
Hausmann, Marco, 2018, “The Consequence Argument Ungrounded”, Synthese, 195 (11): 4931–4950. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1436-6 (Scholar)
Hawthorne, John, 2001, “Freedom in Context”, Philosophical Studies, 104(1): 63–79. doi:10.1023/a:1010398805497 (Scholar)
Herdova, Marcela, 2021, “The Importance of Being Ernie”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 10 (4): 257–263. doi:10.1002/tht3.503 (Scholar)
Hobart, R.E., 1934, “Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without It”, Mind, 63(169): 1–27. Reprinted in van Inwagen & Zimmerman 2008: 420–432. (Scholar)
Hoefer, Carl, 2002, “Freedom from the Inside Out”, in Time, Reality, and Experience, Craig Callender (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
–––, 2003 [2016], “Causal Determinism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-causal/> (Scholar)
Holbach, Baron, 1770, “The Illusion of Free Will”, from The System of Nature (Système de la nature). Translated by H.D. Robinson. Reprinted in The Experience of Philosophy, Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 5th edition: 176–181. (Scholar)
Holliday, Wesley H., 2012, “Freedom and the Fixity of the Past”, The Philosophical Review, 121(2): 179–207. doi:10.1215/00318108-1539080 (Scholar)
–––, 2017, “Freedom and Modality”, in Keller 2017: 149–156. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.003.0009 (Scholar)
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Horgan, Terence, 1985, “Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 47(3): 339–56. doi:10.1007/bf00355208 (Scholar)
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Huemer, Michael, 2000, “Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument”, The Philosophical Review, 109(4): 525–544. doi:10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 (Scholar)
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Jaster, Romy, 2020, Agents’ Abilities, Berlin: de Gruyter. (Scholar)
Jeppsson, Sofia, 2020, “The Agential Perspective: a Hard-Line Reply to the Four-Case Manipulation Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 177(7): 1935–1951. doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01292-2 (Scholar)
Kane, Robert, 1996, The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 (Scholar)
–––, 1999, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism”, Journal of Philosophy, 96(5): 217–240. Reprinted in Watson 2003: ch. 15 and Russell & Deery 2013: ch. 10. doi:10.2307/2564666 (Scholar)
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Libet, Benjamin, 1999, “Do We Have Free Will?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8–9): 47–57. Reprinted in Russell and Deery 2013, ch. 24 and Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2011: 1–10. (Scholar)
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Loewer, Barry, 1996a, “Humean Supervenience”, Philosophical Topics, 24(1): 101–27. doi:10.5840/philtopics199624112 (Scholar)
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Mackie, Penelope, 2003, “Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise”, Noûs, 37(4): 672–689. doi:10.1046/j.1468-0068.2003.00455.x (Scholar)
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