A new write-up from Invaders breaks down CVE-2026-35616 puts FortiClient EMS at risk of unauthenticated code execution. Fortinet says CVE-2026-35616 in FortiClient EMS is being exploited in the wild. Versions 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 need immediate hotfixing while 7.4.7 will carry the permanent fix. What stands out here is the practical defender impact and why this kind of issue should be prioritized quickly. Read the full analysis: https://lnkd.in/dm8NQPmT

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/3O1MIoY

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4vsoWDe

This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4tSJDqs

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4vmo0QK

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4vvD3Yx

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4vzxTdQ

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4sCQymB

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/4e7iDir

The CPU-Z attack traveled inside a legitimately signed binary from CPUID's own download portal. No exploit required. This supply chain attack didn't exploit a vulnerability. It exploited trust: a signed, verified binary from an official domain doing exactly what you'd expect a trusted download to do. By the time a hash shows up in a threat feed, the damage is done. This is why behavior matters more than signatures. Our agent identified what the software was attempting to do and terminated it before the payload could complete. See how it played out → https://bit.ly/3QFi9Gd