AMONG the republics of the former Soviet Union, Turkmenistan, with a population approaching five million, attracts particular attention from several standpoints. It has one of the largest gas reserves in the world; unusually high GDP growth rates (almost 20 per cent in 2002); its government provides exceptional social benefits--free gas, water and electricity, housing subsidies and very low public transportation fees. As a result, Turkmenistan enjoys an unusually calm socio-political situation, which particularly stands out against the rise of Islamic radicalism in other Central Asian republics. And finally, based on its proclaimed neutral status, Turkmenistan refrains from geopolitical games in Central Asia, such as the 'Great Game' for regional hegemony and natural resources between the USA, Russia, Iran and China. (See Contemporary Review. December 2001.)
Turkmenistan has also been a source of bemusement to the outside world because of the eccentric exploits of its president, Saparmurat Niazov, officially known as Turkmenbashi (literally, 'Chief of the Turkmen'), whose personality cult rivals that of Saddam Hussein. Niazov was unanimously approved as president for life by the Turkmen National Assembly on 28 December 1999. This leads to a logical question: how does he manage to ensure political stability and economic growth in the absence of democratic institutions, in keeping with his statement that Turkmen society is not ready to introduce a multi-party system?
Absolutism and Spiritual Guidance
The main principle is the principle of absolutism. As the head of executive power, Turkmenbashi tries to manage personally all spheres of social life. 'Our society is not mature enough for a civilized multi-party system, and there are no people psychologically or financially prepared to become owners of big factories', Niazov has said, adding that he will move Turkmenistan towards democracy, but slowly, only after 'not one Turkmen is left complaining about going without sausage and bread for a day'.
Lately, for instance, he signed a decree about a twofold increase of pensions and allowances since 1 May 2003. According to another recent decree, the size of salaries of workers and students' allowances were raised twice as well. Niazov signed a decree on 22 January 2003 raising to 1.5 million manat ($290 at the official exchange rate) the average monthly salary of government employees, which is very high by regional standards, compared to the $50 average in Uzbekistan and $70 in Azerbaijan.
Political life in the country is based on the activity of only one party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, headed by Niazov, which for all intents and purposes is nothing more than the former Communist Party of Turkmenistan. There are more political slogans and propaganda messages now than there were in the old Soviet days, such as 'Halk, Vatan, Beyuk Turkmenbashi' ('People, Motherland, Turkmenbashi the Great') and 'XXI Asyr Turkmenin Altyn Asyry" ('21st Century is Turkmen Golden Century').
Ashgabat means the 'City of Love' in the Farsi (Persian) language. The drive into the capital Ashgabat from Turkmenbashi airport goes along Turkmenbashi Avenue, and passes by Turkmenbashi Stadium. On the streets of Ashgabat one sees banners, portraits and statues of Turkmenbashi--almost every building has a wall-sized picture of him on the facade, not to mention the ports, towns and streets which have been renamed after this 'greatly beloved' leader. There are an estimated 2000 statues of him in the country. A colossal golden statue in Ashgabat's Neutrality Square is mounted onto a revolving tower more than 100 metres high, which turns around all the time, making Turkmenbashi appear to summon the sun at dawn and bid it farewell at dusk.
When a 670-lb meteorite landed in Turkmenistan in 1999, Turkmen scientists named it after Turkmenbashi. After a petition by the 'workers of the city', the Caspian port of Krasnovodsk was renamed Turkmenbashi. His birthday is a national holiday. He became even more well-known recently after renaming all the months of the year and days of the week. When January was renamed after himself, as 'Turkmenbashi', the speaker of the Turkmen parliament promptly suggested that April be called after Niazov's mother's name. Niazov immediately agreed to the request. Other months were renamed after the Turkmen epic heroes, as well as the president's book, Ruhnama.
According to his admirers, Turkmenbashi is one of the greatest philosophers and writers. He published in 2001 a 500-page treatise entitled Ruhnama ('Book of the Soul') with the subtitle Reflections on the Spiritual Values of the Turkmen, a heavy tome of advice and observations that has become required reading for adults and children alike. Now, with the publication of Ruhnama, Niazov appears intent on dominating the country's spiritual and literary life as well. The book has been promoted as the single most important source for spiritual growth in Turkmenistan. Bookstores have cleared their shelves to make way for the presidential opus, and television and newspaper reports have likened the work to the Koran.
I bought its English edition. In it Niazov, who is 63 years old, narrates his family history and life--how his father died in the Second World War and his mother and brothers were killed in the great Ashgabat earthquake of 1948. In one passage from Ruhnama, Niazov describes how he was visited by the ghost of a legendary Turkmen hero, Koroglu, who called on him to lead the country to spiritual greatness: 'The soul of Koroglu said: The nation that travels a straight road is happy. The happiness of the nation is the basis of the brave preservation of the country and the territory. Today, the happiness of your nation is in your hands. Saparmurat, show the way of the golden life to the Turkmen nation. This will be your task; this will be your way'.
This grandiose claim may sound laughable to outsiders, but for the Turkmen it is not. Ruhnama has become compulsory reading at all the country's schools and universities. Citizens must now demonstrate sufficient understanding of the book in order to receive degrees, documents and licenses, because on its pages Turkmenbashi spells out his vision for his country and, in detail, how Turkmen should behave towards family, friends and neighbours. Ruhnama is, indeed, a kind of bible, moral code, history book, national development plan, and autobiography combined. No wonder some Turkmen claim it is one of the greatest books ever written in history.
In Ruhnama, Niazov also usurps world history, taking many of the world's most seminal moments and recasting them as Turkmen history. There is his interpretation of Turkmen history, which basically tells us that Turkmenistan ranks as one of the five greatest ancient civilizations in the world (ranking alongside China, Egypt, India and Mesopotamia), that the Turkmen invented the wheel, the use of iron and most great inventions of mankind; that Turkmen founded great empires such as the Seljuk, Ottoman and every empire in Central Asia.
He also takes a creative approach in retelling Turkmenistan's recent history, altering events that many Turkmen lived through and still remember, including the fact that he opposed the collapse of the Soviet Union and was among the last of the former Soviet leaders finally, grudgingly, to declare independence. In Ruhnama, Niazov instead fashions himself as the bold founder of independent Turkmenistan.
Writing books on spiritual guidance is not a new phenomenon in Central Asia. Throughout history, the region's rulers either came to power as poets or went on to author poetic or philosophical works. The Emir of Samarkand, Tamerlane ('Timur the Lame'), who built a formidable 14th-century empire stretching from the Black Sea to the upper Ganges, was the author of the famous Code of Timur, which laid out key principles of state management. Tamerlane's descendant, Muhammad Babur, who went on to found the Great Mogul Empire in India in the sixteenth century, is considered one of the world's greatest poets. His autobiography, Baburnama, is still considered a literary and historical masterpiece.
It is this historical tradition, combined with the superstitious mentality typical of Central Asians, that paved the way for Niazov's self-appointment as spiritual leader of the Turkmen. But if, by writing Ruhnama, Niazov is looking to put himself in the historical ranks of great leaders like Tamerlane and Babur, he is also nodding to a more recent tradition. Niazov is not the only former communist leader of Central Asia to keep this tradition alive. Uzbek president Islam Karimov published his tenth volume of speeches; his books are also mandatory reading at Uzbekistan's schools and universities. Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbaev and Kyrgyzstan president Askar Akaev, together with their wives, have both written several books that are also compulsory reading for students in their countries. Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov has authored a book on the history of the Tajik people.
What sets Niazov's literary efforts apart, however, is that Ruhnama is the only book to present itself as a spiritual guide, and Niazov is the only president to lay claim to the additional title of spiritual leader. But I would not disparage Niazov, who is far from being primitive. He is an experienced politician, in a very Asian way, which is unusual for those with a European mindset, who find most of his actions, like those of many Asian politicians, incomprehensible. But in Turkmenistan, in this Asian society that has started to return to its archaic, tribal code of existence, he is, to some extent, in the right place.
In the name of building Turkmen nationhood, for example, Niazov banned opera, ballet, the philharmonic orchestra and the circus. The government even closed the Academy of Sciences. Non-Turkmen cultural organizations were banned. Niazov has gone to great lengths to isolate his people by introducing exit visas, and citizens have to pay a $50,000 fee to register a marriage with a foreigner. In such conditions, if Niazov's arrogance appears to have reached a pathological degree, it would be logical to look for a reason not only in his character, but in the environment in which he rules. For example, the intent of the marriage decree, requiring that foreigners deposit $50,000 with the state insurance agency, was to solve a real problem--the abandonment of Turkmen women and their children by foreign businessmen who concluded marriages of convenience while residing in Turkmenistan.
Niazov has just published a book of his poetry on what he considers the threemajor vices plaguing Turkmenistan. According to him, the three vices are self-satisfaction, boasting, and internal disputes. He reportedly read some of the verses from this collection during the 26 May 2003 cabinet meeting at which the Minister of Defence was dismissed, and he told the military officers present at the meeting that the poems concerned them. Niazov has purportedly been writing verses for a number of years, but he began reading them in public and they began appearing in the media and were set to music only after the publication in 2001 of the Ruhnama.
Turkmenistan, my beloved motherland, my beloved homeland!
You are always with me, in my thoughts and in my heart.
For the slightest evil against you, let my hand be lost!
For the slightest slander about you, let my tongue be lost!
At the moment of my betrayal of my motherland, of her sacred
banner, Of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi the Great, let my breath stop!
This is Turkmenistan's 'National Oath'. Every citizen knows it by heart, and schoolchildren recite this everyday. It is printed on the front page of every issue of the national newspaper, The Neutral Turkmenistan.
Assassination Attempt: Who Pulled the Strings?
On the morning of 25 November 2002, the president's motorcade came under fire in Ashgabat as he was travelling to his office from his residence in Arshabil, 28 kilometres out of town. The initial story reported that a lorry blocked the motorcade, and a single gunman jumped out and started shooting. According to Niazov's own account, a number of men emerged from the lorry, and two other cars, and raked the motorcade with machine-gun fire. The story changed again when a presidential spokesman said the lorry cut in front of the convoy, not behind, and masked gunmen emerged from the lorry, two minibuses and a BMW, and that more assailants ran out of nearby residential buildings and opened fire.
Niazov's car was untouched: in fact, he said he had not even noticed the attack at the time, being immersed in paperwork in the back of his car. 'When I got to work, I was informed there had been a shoot-out', he said. The conflicting stories may merely reflect the confusion of officials trying to get a grip on what happened. But another line of thought was suggested by one of Niazov's exiled opponents, who told a Russian newspaper that the president staged the apparent attack himself. By precipitating a crisis, Niazov supposedly gave himself a pretext for a crackdown and purge of his enemies.
Who were the gunmen and who stood behind them? Niazov's semiofficial website turkmenistan.ru claimed that at least two of the gunmen were killed at the scene by security forces. Amnesty International estimated the number of arrests at more than 100 by December, more than half of whom were foreigners. The prosecutor-general, Gurbanbibi Atajanova, revealed that three Chechen mercenaries, six Turks, four Russians and an American had been involved in the assassination attempt. She charged Leonid Komarovsky, a US citizen of Moldovan origin, with being part of the conspiracy. His wife told The Moscow limes on 4 December 2002 that he happened to be in the country to explore the feasibility of establishing a business importing Czech beer into Turkmenistan.
Who masterminded and financed the plot? At an emergency cabinet session convened after the attack, Niazov named his four most prominent rivals as the organizers: former foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov, former National Bank chief Hudayberdi Orazov, former ambassador to Turkey Nurmuhammed Hanamov, and former deputy agriculture minister Saparmurat Iklymov. The first three were living in exile in Moscow; Iklymov was granted political asylum in Sweden.
Within days a new prime suspect emerged: prosecutors charged Guvanch Jumaev, a prominent Turkmen businessman who used to be a government official, with orchestrating the coup attempt. Komarovsky was arrested at Jumaev's home in Ashgabat. 'Jumaev owns 29 drugstores. Where does he get the medicine to sell? He sells medicines intended for humanitarian aid, and he doesn't care about their quality. Everyone knew he was dishonest, but nobody stopped him', Niazov told a cabinet meeting covered live by national television on 2 December 2002.
Meanwhile, the Turkmen authorities had turned their attention to foreign governments that might be backing the plotters. Many analysts speculated that the Russian authorities were indeed informally backing Turkmen dissidents in Moscow. Niazov also blasted Turkey for financing the assassination attempt after six Turks were accused of participating in the attack.
Prosecutor-general Atajanova said that opposition leader Shikhmuradov arrived in the Uzbek town of Qarshi and slipped across the border in order to be on hand to seize power after the planned assassination of Niazov. She accused Uzbekistan's ambassador in Ashgabat, Abdurashid Kadyrov, of hiding Shikhmuradov in the embassy after the attack failed. On 16 December, Turkmen officers forcibly entered the Uzbek embassy in Ashgabat and searched the ambassador's residence. Atajanova said the plotters hid out in the building from 26 November until 7 December. The Uzbek foreign minister dismissed these charges as groundless, but Turkmen authorities offered neither apologies nor explanations for raiding the Uzbek embassy, declaring Kadyrov persona non grata and demanding that he leave the country within 24 hours.
Is it likely that Tashkent might actually have colluded in a plot to eliminate Niazov? Could the fact that Niazov recently refused Karimov permission to use his Caspian ports and railways to export Uzbek goods, or the fact that Uzbekistan has various outstanding land, water, and energy disputes with its neighbour, or that Central Asia would simply be a more stable and predictable place without the erratic Niazov in power, be relevant in this regard? Tashkent has a history of trying to undermine neighbouring regimes, as when it supported the failed coup in Tajikistan in 1998 headed by the Tajik army colonel Mahmud Hudayberdiev, and still supports the private Uzbek army of general Abdurashid Dostum in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Turkmen special services maintained that Shikhmuradov was still in the country, and indeed captured him in Ashgabat on 25 December2002 in the apartment of a local physician. The arrest was followed by Shikhmuradov's sensational televised confession. Although the prisoner said he was making his confession voluntarily, human rights groups accused the Turkmen authorities of using torture as part of their investigation, comparing Shikhmuradov's self-incrimination to the Stalinist show trials in the 1930s. Shikhmuradov was filmed sitting in front of a blank wall. Speaking in Russian, he began by calling himself and his allies--Hanamov, former ambassador to Turkey, and Orazov, former Central Bank chief--traitors to the fatherland and members of a criminal gang who would do anything for money.
'When we lived in Russia, we took drugs and, while in a state of intoxication, prepared people and recruited mercenaries to carry out a terrorist attack. Being part of a criminal conspiracy, we were making promises to those who agreed to carry out our order, which was to destabilize the situation in Turkmenistan, to undermine the constitutional order, and to carry out an assassination attempt against the president of Turkmenistan', Shikhmuradov said. 'I am not a man able to rule a state; on the contrary, I am a criminal able only to destroy the state. I am guilty', he added. He also admitted, 'I take drugs, and I am unable to exist without heroin'.
He said the plotters had arranged a charter flight from Moscow to Turkmenistan in order to seize power after Niazov's death. He further alleged that Arkadiy Dubnov, a Moscow-based journalist, had been paid $30,000 to promote the new Turkmen leadership in the Russian mass media. Meanwhile, Shikhmuradov said he went ahead of the others to prepare the ground in Turkmenistan, where he was aided by Uzbek ambassador Kadyrov. Following the failure of the assassination attempt, the ambassador hid him at his residence for two weeks. Thereafter, Shikhmuradov said, he moved to a friend's apartment where he was arrested.
Shikhmuradov confessed that he financed the planned coup attempt from the 1994 theft and subsequent sale of five Su-17 military aircraft and other state property. Turkmen authorities accused him of this theft shortly after he declared his opposition to Niazov in 2001. Finally, the prisoner expressed deep contrition at organizing a crime against Niazov, whom he described as 'a gift given to the people from on high'. He said the president's 'absolutely correct' policies guaranteed the well-being of Turkmenistan's citizens. Devastated that he had 'betrayed this great person', Shikhmuradov invited the president to punish him however he chose.
Following Shikhmuradov's statement, Turkmen television broadcast further confessions and declarations of regret by businessmen Iklymov, Jumaev and Komarovsky, who had been accused of complicity in the assassination attempt. They appealed to Niazov for forgiveness.
Shikhmuradov was sentenced to 25 years in prison on 30 December 2002. The maximum punishment under the Turkmen Criminal Code is 25 years. The death penalty was abolished in 1999. Niazov announced that only Allah had the right to condemn someone to death, and that in any case death would be too light a punishment for Shikhmuradov and his cohorts. 'They won't have death, but they won't get forgiveness either. Let them experience all the harshness of prison', the president said in the televised proceedings. The People's Council, Turkmenistan's supreme representative and legislative body, promptly adopted a special amendment to the Criminal Code stipulating life imprisonment for traitors to the fatherland. On the basis of the new amendment, it overrode the Supreme Court's decision and changed Shikhmuradov's sentence to life in jail.
On 8 January 2003 the main newspapers in Turkmenistan published an 'open letter' claiming that the US ambassador in Ashgabat, Laura Kennedy, spoke three times by telephone to Boris Shikhmuradov while the latter was hiding in the Uzbek embassy. The letter implied that Kennedy expressed approval of Uzbek ambassador Kadyrov's efforts to help Shikhmuradov flee Turkmenistan. Accusing the official US envoy of 'a stab in the back' turned out to be the next turn in the sensational events in Turkmenistan.
With the mastermind already behind bars, judges in Ashgabat set to work sending alleged co-plotters to jail. Sixty-one men went on trial. The Supreme Court handed down a life sentence on businessmen Jumaev, Annasahatov, Orazgeldiev and Iklym Iklymov, brother of former deputy agriculture minister Saparmurat Iklymov, who lives in Sweden. Jumaev's son Timur was also sentenced to a 25-year jail term, and Jumaev's brother and father received 20 years each. The court also ordered that their property be confiscated, targeting not only individuals but their family members as well. Their families were exiled to settlements in the Karakum Desert.
A further ten men received sentences ranging from 20 to 25 years in jail. Among them were former parliament Speaker Tagandurdy Khallyev and an Uzbek citizen Horsaid Safarov. On 21 January seven more people were designated 'traitors to the fatherland' and incarcerated. They included former Turkmen foreign minister Batyr Berdyev, former Dashoguz province governor Yazgeldy Gundogdyev and former head of the Turkmen border service Akmurat Kabulov: all were given 25-year sentences. Boris Shikhmuradov's brother Konstantin and one Rustam Jumaev received 17- and 18-year sentences.
On 22 January Niazov told a government session that 46 conspirators had been sentenced. Tallies of convictions differ among observers given the secrecyshrouding the trials, but of the 46 apparently seven men had received life sentences and eight men had received 25-year sentences. The US citizen, Komarovsky, was handed over to an American consul in Ashgabat on 24 April 2003 for deportation to the United States. Six Turkish citizens, who were arrested, had already been deported to Turkey, along with the four arrested Russian citizens.
The impression that Niazov might be using the November attack as a pretext to settle old scores was boosted by the fact that the former head and deputy head of the National Security Committee (KNB) Saparmurat Seidov and Orazmuhammed Berdyev were also caught in the net and convicted. Rumors of festering dissatisfaction and growing opposition to the president within the ranks of the KNB have been rife since its chief, Muhammed Nazarov, was summarily toppled and imprisoned in May 2002.
Any form of opposition remains dangerous. Tajigul Begmedova fled to Bulgaria and set up a human rights body there to monitor events in Turkmenistan. Unable to get at her, the police seized her 77-year-old father and last month sent him into internal exile.
New Projects
For much of the past decade, international observers questioned whether Niazov's grip on Turkmenistan was slipping. They pointed to the defections of several high-profile officials and the growth of an opposition movement in exile as evidence that Niazov's days as Turkmenistan's leader might be numbered. But the country's political calculus has shifted dramatically since the failed assassination attempt, and doubts about Niazov's authority have dissipated. He has proven himself a skilful player in the game of political survival who should not be underestimated. Now, in the aftermath of a failed attempt against his life, Niazov finds his personal authority greater than at any time since Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991. He has thoroughly neutralized the exile-led effort to oust him. Having broken the back of the opposition-in-exile movement, Niazov now appears intent to make certain that it never makes a recovery.
In addition, Niazov has taken steps to strengthen security ties with Russia. He has struck a security cooperation deal with Putin, under which Turkmen opposition leaders will be effectively denied a vital base for future activities. Niazov paid an official visit to Moscow in April 2003, where he signed agreements on security cooperation, exporting Turkmen gas to Russia, and cancelled a dual citizenship deal between Russia and Turkmenistan. A protocol signed by Turkmenistan and Russia will aim to simplify extradition procedures and also clarify questions relating to dual Russian-Turkmen citizens. Many of the leaders implicated in the assassination attempt held both Russian and Turkmen citizenship. Russia traditionally has been a major centre of activity for opposition leaders. If implemented, the new measures would expose Turkmen exiles in Russia to a heightened risk of extradition.
In striking a deal with Niazov, Russia hopes to extend its influence in Central Asia. In recent months, the Kremlin has sought to restore its geopolitical position in the region, which had been eroded in the aftermath of the American intervention in Afghanistan. Not only is Moscow interested in enhancing its position regarding oil and gas exports, it is also eager to protect Russian cultural interests. In recent years, all Central Asian leaders have acted to curtail dramatically access to Russian culture, including television broadcasts and Russian-language education.
Turkmenistan's gas reserves are estimated to be over 22 trillion cubic metres, the fourth largest in the world. The agreement signed between Putin and Niazov states that Russia will purchase about 2 trillion cubic metres of Turkmen gas within 25 years at the price of $44 per 1000 cubic metres. This agreement will bring $200 billion of income to Turkmenistan whereas Russia will gain $300 billion. Niazov agreed that Russia would pay half of the fee for gas in cash and the rest would be compensated with Russian goods. Given the current level of world gas prices at more than double what Turkmenistan will receive, the conclusion that comes to mind is that this was the ultimate prize that Turkmenbashi was willing to pay to Moscow for keeping himself in power.
The climate for operations of Western corporations within the country appears to be less attractive. For example, Royal Dutch Shell is intending to close its office in Ashgabat, and Exxon Mobil shut down its operations in 2001. Since the early years of independence, Niazov has been coming up with a number of gas pipeline projects, with the aim to boost gas exports bypassing the northern route through Russia. He spent days and weeks of talks with heads of states and other officials, discussing numerous gas pipeline projects, including the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey option, the Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-China, the Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, and the last, widely discussed project, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan with possible extension to India. What Turkmenistan succeeded to accomplish is the construction of a single, 140 km long gas pipeline from Korpeje in southern Turkmenistan to Kurtkui in northern Iran with exports of 5 billion cubic metres to Iran annually starting in 1998.
All other projects still remain at the stage of wishful thinking. During the ten years since 1993, Russia succeeded in building the Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea to Turkey with an annual capacity of 16 billion cubic metres of gas. Iran completed a gas pipeline to Turkey and has been exporting gas to Turkey for the last two years. According to the agreement, Iran is intending to export more than 520 billion cubic metres of gas to Turkey during the upcoming twenty-year period.
And in this situation, Turkmen authorities are announcing another gas pipeline project Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-Russia. The length of the pipeline is expected to be 1070 kilometres with a capacity of 30-40 billion cubic metres annually. It is necessary to mention that since the 1970s, five different gas pipelines go to Russia from Central Asia, carrying mainly Turkmen gas, as well as small volumes of Uzbek gas, to customers in Russia, the Ukraine, and partly to Georgia and Armenia.
Ashgabat is also exporting another 5 billion cubic metres of gas to Iran, and the domestic consumption in Turkmenistan accounts for another 15 billion cubic metres. Altogether, this totals 80 billion cubic metres of gas annually. Experts in the oil and gas industry of Central Asia believe that the aforementioned volume of gas extraction is close to the limit of the Turkmen gas industry's capacity. To extract an additional 30-40 billion cubic metres of gas, the Turkmen gas industry will require $4-6 billion in investments.
Turkmenbashi has another grandiose project. He wants to create a freshwater lake in a salt depression in the northern Turkmen desert. The project is planned to take twenty years and costs $4.5 billion. The first water is expected to arrive in what is to become the lakebed in 18 months. The project is intended to collect irrigation-drainage water from agricultural areas in much of Turkmenistan in the Karashor Depression, which lies in the Karakum Desert far from any habitation. Experts and environmentalists have serious reservations about the project, pointing out that the low level of funding means the feeder canals cannot be lined. As a result, most or even all of the drainage water will disappear into the sand. Detractors predict the result will be swamps in the Karakum. Niazov has said, however, that passage through the sands will purify the drainage water, and as a result the lake will contain fresh water. He envisages that it will eventually be surrounded by forests and cities.
The question that must be raised in conclusion is whether Turkmenbashi cares about the opinion of the outside world. Intent on smashing his enemies and supporting a welfare state, Niazov has shown himself to be increasingly dismissive of international criticism of his regime's human rights record and economic policy, making his oil-rich, but sealed off desert state even more isolated than it already is.
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