Serdyukov Cleans Up the Arbat

Ruslan Pukhov

Anatoly Serdyukov�s surprise appointment in February 2007 as Minister of Defense came as a shock to the military, to politicians, and independent experts. The former furniture dealer�s experience in government was limited to the tax departments, even if he rose quickly up the ranks to become Chief of the Federal Tax Service.

Surprise gave way to irony and skepticism that a man with his background could make any headway against the staunchly conservative defense establishment; but attitudes changed dramatically in short order, as Serdyukov�s first year in office was marked by convulsions, the likes of which have not been seen on the Arbat in decades. Like a modern Hercules cleaning out the Augean stables, Serdyukov brought apparently unlimited energy to a thorough purge of the department.

Following the initial dismissal of Colonel General Anatoly Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Directorate for International Affairs, and of General of the Army Aleksey Moskovsky, Deputy Minister and Chief of Armament, came the further dismissals in May of General of the Army Vladimir Mikhailov, Commander in Chief of the Air Force, ostensibly due to his advanced age, and Colonel General Boris Chelstov, Chief of the Air Force Supreme Headquarters. The same fate befell the Navy in September, as Commander in Chief Admiral Vladimir Masorin was forced to retire, and replaced by Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky.

In the fall, Colonel General Aleksandr Kolmakov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, while Lieutenant General Valery Evtukhovich took his place as Commander of the Airborne Troops. Former border guard and now nominal civilian Oleg Eskin was also appointed Deputy Minister. Colonel General Nikolai Resnik was dismissed as Chief of the Main Directorate for Morale and given a position as an adviser to the Minister. Finally, the �tamer of Chechnya� Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov was appointed Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate for Military Training and Service, which has resumed its former stature as one of the most important structures of the renewed defense department. Even more changes to the top leadership were awaited throughout the year. Lyubov Kudelina, the chief financier of the MoD, and General of the Army Vladimir Isakov, who has been Chief of Logistics for the past eleven years, were widely expected to go. Rumors circulated constantly about the dismissal of Yury Baluyevsky, General of the Army and Chief of the General Staff, even though his term was formally extended to 2010. It seems that Kudelina�s and Baluyevsky�s backers are still fighting back-room battles in the Kremlin and White house.

Actually, these appointments, each of which was naturally followed by the migration of subordinates from one office to another, are just surface signs of the sea change that has taken place in the MoD under Serdyukov. One of the main accomplishments of his leadership has been to instill an atmosphere of �shock and awe� in the halls of the department.

Serdyukov made a point off not getting involved in the daily administration of troops and operational-strategic planning, leaving these matters to the professionals. Instead, he focused on organizational and budgetary issues, and in these spheres he insisted upon an unprecedented (at least for the MoD) level of precision and fastidiousness. He was thus able in short order to put the generals in their place and to instill a level of background fear that even the old-timers do not recall having seen before. As an officer in one of the central directorates of the MoD explained: �senior generals go to meetings of the Defense Board as to the scaffold.�

Some interesting stories about Sedyukov�s style are beginning to emerge from those who have seen him in action. According to one account:

�At meetings of the MoD Board, Igor Rodionov used to read prepared speeches from beginning to end. Sergey Ivanov would improvise and deviate from the text; moreover, he would offend sensibilities, breaking protocol and smoking during official meetings. Serdyukov comes prepared, having studied the reports, but he speaks without referring to any notes and throws out questions that are not always on the agenda but which always hit the mark, leaving many respondents grasping at straws.�

Here, for example, are some questions he put to generals responsible for morale: �How many agreements were signed this year with civilian universities for the free education of officer�s children?�

� �Actually, none, Comrade Minister!�

� �You might be able to pay for a private education for your children, but an officer from some far-off garrison, who makes from 10,000 to15,000 rubles per month, cannot. Why has this Ministry, which has influence over the civilian colleges, not seen fit to do anything about this? Report!�

And here is a question posed to the head of the housing department: �Why is the department building housing according to old blueprints that allow for the bare minimum of living space, while paying the same rate as for elite housing? Report!�

To the Deputy Minister of Defense: he asked: �How many testing ranges are owned by the MoD? How much land do they cover?� Getting no response, Serdyukov continues: �Who permitted the construction of private cottages on the territory of these ranges, such as at Senezhsky? Report!�

Similar questions put to officers of Logistics, the Main Mobilization Directorate, the Main Armor Directorate, the Main Missile-Artillery Directorate and others carry the same message: no more stealing!

The new minister regularly initiates wide-ranging investigations that have led to significant operational changes to the ministry. Immediately upon his appointment, Serdyukov ordered an audit of the financial compliance and effectiveness of main and central directorates of the Ministry and General Staff, along with the chief commands and service headquarters. Moreover, these inspections were conducted by people who have never worked for the military and were brought to the ministry by Serdyukov, including many who worked with him in the tax departments, including former Deputy Chief of the Federal Tax Service Sergey Khursevich and several of his colleagues.

Serdyukov also invited former VP for finance of the oil company TNK-BP (and former Deputy Minister of Finance) Mikhail Motorin to the Ministry. As a MoD source lamented: �inspections are now being conducted by people who have neither slept on armor nor toasted to friendship with the people they are auditing.�

Anti-corruption measures taken by Serdyukov have been met with open opposition and led to many dismissals � even one suicide. Nevertheless, the Minister�s actions to bring corrupt networks to light and some order to the military�s finances have had a palpable effect with positive resonance among the public.

The new Minister has also begun to address such acute and long-standing issues as the ineffectiveness of Russia�s defense industrial and procurement policies. Why, with so much spending on defense, do the Armed Forces possess so little new equipment? Why does the design and testing of many new types of armament take decades to show results? Soon after his appointment, Serdyukov asked the Ministry of Defense Military-Technical Commission a number of pointed questions. The Minister wondered aloud why the Military-Technical Commission artificially delay the acceptance or refusal to accept advanced armament prototypes. Serdyukov did, however, take care to safeguard the deciding vote of the Ministry of Defense on the procurement of military equipment and not allow final decision making to pass to the recently-created Federal Agency for Armament, Military, Special Equipment and Material Resources Procurement.

Serdyukov has brought a new approach to many aspects the department�s work. He initiated, for instance, modifications to the Russian military uniform, which has in many respects become outdated and uncomfortable. He has also addressed the issue of the physical condition of Russia�s generals and senior officers. The entire service personnel of the General Staff, irrespective of rank, must now meet set physical standards upon threat of dismissal.

He also launched plans to reduce the personnel in the central administration by 30%, which would lead first of all to the liquidation of a significant number of positions filled by generals and colonels. Another important project would have many positions that do relate directly to combat readiness to be filled by civilians, such as accountants, lawyers, doctors, etc. A significant proportion of the department support services will also be contracted out to civilian firms.

Given the extraordinarily high prices for real-estate in Moscow, Serdyukov�s move to sell off surplus land and buildings owned by the Ministry and to use these funds to construct housing for service personnel has proven timely and effective.

One further measure that deserves mention is the decision made May 8, 2007 on the one-time declassification of practically all Red Army archival documents of the WWII period, allowing researchers almost unrestricted access. Paradoxically, over the past 20 years of �democratic� rule none of the �democratic� rulers has done anything of the kind, not only in relation to archival documents of the Ministry of Defense but for any other archives.

As a result of one year�s work by the new Minister, the central agencies are working at a quicker pace in a new, businesslike atmosphere. Many obvious problems are finally being resolved, issues that have been dismissed as secondary but which are actually extremely important. Serdyukov�s metal broom is clearly working, and everyone involved with the military feels the winds of change. The MoD is working in an increasingly transparent manner and has demonstrated a new willingness to engage the public. Moreover, Serdyukov works without attracting undue attention or creating needless sensations with statements and promises on military-political or internal defense affairs. He generally avoids publicity and acts in a calm, methodical, and consistent manner.

However, Serdyukov was appointed not just to clean a rusty military machine, eliminate obvious abuses and whip the over-fed corps of generals back into shape both literally and figuratively. His mission is broader and of greater significance, and he has shown himself to be the most able and effective manager to assume the helm of the Russian military since the time of Stalin�s commissars.

Indeed, it has been precisely bad management that has emerged as the Achilles heel of the Russian military today; the source of the of the military�s chief deficiencies in planning, organization and expenditures. It is precisely the superior management of the West�s political-military machinery, and not greater spending levels, that allow it to maintain its dominant position in the world.

This has become especially apparent in the last two years, as ever-larger tranches of funding have been allocated to the MoD. They have obviously not yet had a transformative effect on the degraded condition of our Armed Forces. And it is precisely the astonishment that lies behind the question: �where is all of the money going?� that is being asked first of all in the Kremlin, that has propelled Anatoly Serdyukov to his appointment. He has been charged with the introduction of an effective, modern system of management to the Russian military.

Over the past year, Serdyukov has shown his grasp of the big picture. Indeed, as �CEO of the MoD,� Serdyukov could be described as one of Putin�s most effective appointments. But it is still far too early to give a conclusive evaluation of his performance. Given the monumental scale of the problems facing Russia�s military, Serdyukov�s biggest challenges almost certainly lie ahead.