Tom Parker, “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements They Oppose,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (2007), Gregory D. Miller, “Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 (2007), Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2006).

Yonah Alexander, ed., Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison Sherley, “Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 4, no. 2 (2006), Miller, (see note 1 above), Alex P. Schmid, “Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a Multi-pronged Approach,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. Tore Bjørgo (London: Routledge, 2005).

For a recap of some of this discussion as pertains to strategic choice, see Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000).

William Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider's View (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 69, David A. Charters, “The amateur revolutionaries: A reassessment of the FLQ,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 1 (1997).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970 (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70); see also Tetley (see note 4 above), Sean Maloney, “A ‘mere rustle of leaves': Canadian Strategy and the 1970 FLQ Crisis,” Canadian Military Journal, Summer 2000.

The quintessential hagiography of the crisis that represents this common perspective is Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1984).

Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above), 79; see also Salutin, Segal and others cited in Tetley (see note 4 above), 83.

Loomis (see note 6 above).

John Saywell, Quebec 70: A Documentary Narrative (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 73.

Parker (see note 1 above), Wilkinson (see note 1 above), Miller (see note 1 above), G. Davidson Smith, “Canada's counter-terrorism experience,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5, no. 1 (1993).

Jean-Francois Cardin, Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et le Syndicalisme (Montreal: Éditions du Méridien, 1990), 255.

Louis Fournier, FLQ: Histoire d'une Mouvement Clandestin (Outremont: Lantôt Éditeur, 1998), 309, 34, 36, see also Jean-François Duchaîne, “Rapport sur les événements d'octobre 1970,” (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 1981), 76.

Cardin (see note 11 above), 83–85.; Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above) 76; Fournier (see note 12 above), 318.

Cardin (see note 11 above), 84, my translation.

Alexander (see note 2 above), Andrew Silke, “Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to be Done,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, ed. Bjørgo Tore (London: Routledge, 2005), John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006), Richard Jackson, “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism,” Democracy and Security 1, no. 2 (2005), Jessica Wolfendale, “Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 7 (2006).

“Rational” here is in the sense of logically relating means to ends. When speaking of coercive military means and political ends, this is the very definition of “strategy.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The Making of Strategy: Rules, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

in The Oxford Reference Dictionary, ed. Joyce M. Hawkins (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

John Robert Ferris, “Intelligence and Diplomatic Signalling during Crises: The British Experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (2006): 692.

Cabinet conclusions, October 22 1970 (No. 63–70), p. 6.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999), 4.

Ibid., 4, 25.

Ibid., 3.

Charters has put the cabinet records to good use in support of his reassessment of the FLQ as a whole, for example. See Charters (note 4 above).

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above), 5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 24.

See, for example, Donald J. Savoie, “The Rise of Court Government in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 32, no. 4 (1999).

The degree to which Prime Minister Trudeau governed independently of cabinet during the October Crisis is the subject of ongoing research by the author, as is the role of individual personalities—notably those of Trudeau and Bourassa—in shaping the events.

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above), 24.

This is particularly noticeable in Cabinet discussions in April 1970, at the time of the Quebec provincial election. See Cabinet Conclusions, April 16 1970 (No. 24–70) and April 30 1970 (No. 27–70). Maloney offers a similar account of federal objectives at the time, though he claims that “intimidat[ing] and disrupt[ing] the separatist movement as a whole” was also an objective of the Trudeau government—though this claim is not supported. See Maloney, “Rustle of Leaves” (note 5 above).

Cabinet conclusions, October 6 1970 (No. 57–70), p. 3.

Cabinet conclusions, October 6 1970 (No. 57–70), p. 3.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning and afternoon (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning and afternoon (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70, respectively); Loomis (see note 6 above), Tetley (see note 4 above).

Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 1988), Fournier (see note 12 above), Saywell (see note 9 above), Charters (see note 4 above).

During the period from October 12–15, for example, the Quebec Cabinet was told of threats received from an FLQ cell named Nelson (or Nelson Vengeur), which had declared that it would assassinate a public figure every 48 hours until the demands were met and provided a list of victims that included several of the members of Cabinet. See Tetley (note 4 above), 204, Saywell (note 9 above), 69.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning (No. 60–70).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning (No. 60–70): Jean Marchand commented “that even with the sweep advocated, the two victims of the kidnapping might not be saved but that, if the F.L.Q. was disorganized, the ultimatum contemplated might be useful” (p. 5).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning and afternoon (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70).

Tetley (see note 4 above), 89–91.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970 morning (No. 60–70), p. 4.

Cardin (see note 11 above), Fournier (see note 12 above).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970 morning (No. 60–70), p. 7, 8.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970 morning (No. 60–70), p. 6.

Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above), Cardin (see note 11 above), Fournier (see note 12 above); see also Salutin, Segal and others cited in Tetley (note 4 above), 83.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning (No. 60–70).

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, afternoon (No. 61–70), p. 4.

Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970, morning and afternoon (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70).

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above), 305.

Ibid., 302.

See, for example, Fournier's discussion of how a series of phone calls between Trudeau, Bourassa and Choquette shaped the Oct. 10th press conference at which Choquette announced the government's refusal of the FLQ's demand that 23 imprisoned members be released. Fournier (note 12 above), 311.

Ibid., 318, Tetley (see note 4 above), 204, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Mémoires politiques (Montréal: Le Jour, 1993), 124.

Fournier (see note 12 above), 319, Tetley (see note 4 above).

Sean Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach,” Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 1997, Cabinet conclusions, 15 October 1970, morning (No. 60–70).

Cabinet conclusions, 15 October 1970, morning (No. 60–70).

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above).

Tetley (see note 4 above).

Cabinet conclusions, 15 October 1970, morning and afternoon (Nos. 60–70 and 61–70).

Tetley, (see note 4 above), 75.

See Appendix 1, Ibid.

Ibid.

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above), 166.

Ibid., 180.

Tetley (see note 4 above), Fournier (see note 12 above).

Allison and Zelikow (see note 20 above), 167, 78.

Fournier (see note 12 above).

Ibid., 297.

Ibid.

Ibid., 290.

The extent to which the different police forces involved had different views on the necessity of emergency powers is discussed in Reg Whitaker, “Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis,” Queen's Quarterly 100, no. 2 (1993): 400.

Fournier (see note 12 above), 299.

Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above), Saywell (see note 9 above), Tetley (see note 4 above).

Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above); Tetley (see note 4 above), 62, particularly Appendices I and D.

Fournier (see note 12 above), 324, my translation.

Ibid., 322–23, Tetley (see note 4 above).

Fournier (see note 12 above), 322–23. Whitaker offers a similar account of the confection of this list, though he notes that the idea of such a list originated with the City of Montreal and was intended to justify their desire for emergency powers. See Whitaker, “Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis,” 398.

Fournier (see note 12 above), 330.

Mr. Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, was detained in the United States and sent by so-called “extraordinary rendition” to Syria in 2002 on the basis of RCMP intelligence documents that identified him as a “person of interest.” See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar,” (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006).

Fournier (see note 12 above), 335.

Report of the Strategic Operations Centre, December 10, 1970, part 3, page 3–4– reproduced as Annex A of Duchaîne (see note 12 above).

Les Archives de Radio-Canada, “Récits de prisonniers – October 70: le Québec en crise,” Société Radio-Canada, http://archives.radio-canada.ca/IDCC-0-9-81-331/guerres_conflits/octobre_70/, Similar problems with the handling of detainees are described by Tetley (see note 4 above).

Fournier (see note 12 above), 335.

Ibid., 337, Tetley (see note 4 above).

Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach” (see note 54 above), Tetley (see note 4 above).

Cabinet conclusions, 15 October 1970, afternoon (No. 61–70).

Fournier (see note 12 above), 324; Cabinet conclusions, October 15 1970 afternoon (No. 61–70).

Tetley (see note 4 above).

For English Canadians at least, the national anthem always promises a “true north strong and free.” French Canadians, on the other hand, were reminded that Canada's arm did know how to wield a sword. (“Car ton bras sait porter l'épée…” is the preceding line in the French lyrics to the anthem.)

Betts (see note 3 above).

Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004).

Loomis (see note 6 above), Parker (see note 1 above), Tetley (see note 4 above), Maloney, “Rustle of leaves,” (see note 5 above), Cardin (see note 11 above), Davidson Smith (see note 10 above), Miller (see note 1 above).