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Separation of powers

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The separation of powers principle functionally differentiates several types of state power (usually legislation, adjudication, and execution) and requires these operations of government to be conceptually and institutionally distinct and clearly articulated, thereby maintaining the integrity of each branch.[1][2] Separation of powers is closely linked to notions of checks and balances, which is a distinct, but link term describing how the separated branches of government can interact in a way to limit oneanother.[3]

Separation of judicial powers from the executive and legislative branches is the norm in modern democracies.[4][5] However, many countries do not separated the legislative and executive branches, but instead follow the principle of fusion of powers.[6] This is the case particularly in parliamentary systems, especially the Westminster system, where parliament (the legislature) is supreme and sovereign. Separation of executive and legislative branches (mitigated by checks and balances) is the main principle in presidential systems and to some degree in semi-presidential governments.[7]

Meaning

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A strict interpretation of the separation of powers would mean none of the three branches may exercise the power of the other, nor should any person be a member of more than one branch.[8] The presidential system of the United States follows this closely, although there exist checks and balances. Separation of powers tempered by checks and balances means branches do have some powers that overlap with the other branches (such as the presidential veto being a legislative power) nominally to combat overreach of the other branches.

Separation of powers is contrasted with the fusion of powers associated with parliamentary systems.[9][10][11]

Shugart highlights two dimensions of separation of powers (and fusion of powers): origin and survival.[7] Origin described the choosing of the executive and survival is the possibility of removal of the executive. Presidential systems are separation of powers systems on both dimensions, parliamentary systems on neither, while directly elected prime ministers and assembly independent executives are "pure hybrids". Semi-presidential systems are more complex hybrids, having both elements of fusion and separation. He also notes that an "informal fusion of powers" may arise in separation of powers system as well.[12]

King and Bellamy argue that separation of powers is a broader term and can also exist in parliamentary system (in particular, when members of government may not be simultaneously members of the executive), but the meaning for the term can be complicated not only when there is personal overlap between branches.[13] For example, in a presidential system a president may exercise veto rights, thereby taking part in the legislature or a house of the legislature may act as a court of impeachment proceedings. Such are generally understood the be checks and balances.

Checks and balances

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In most modern constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine is modified by the notion of moderate, balanced government or checks and balances[14] – a distinct idea that was developed from the ancient theory of mixed government.[15] Since the two concepts developed alongside each other,[16] they have been closely associated, even though they are in conflict to some extent.[17] Further, constitutional provisions – notably those of the United States Constitution[18] – may reflect compromises between the two principles,[19] leading the terms "separation of powers" and "checks and balances" to become shorthand for the institutional distribution of legal authority under a specific constitution. They are at times even used interchangeably.

A government with checks and balances comprises more than one institution (often called a "branch" or "a power") exercising state power, and intends for each institution to have some influence over the other (interdependence). One institution may then "check" the other, or hinder it from using its power to pursue its ends – such as by declaring one of its actions a legal nullity or by questioning and removing one of its officers from their position. For instance, many parliaments consist of two houses; both of which are required to pass a bill before it becomes a law. A system of checks and balances also requires a balance of power between the institutions, so that the goals and actions of one are not completely determined by the other (independence); if both institutions were always in agreement by dint of one dominating the other, they would never challenge each other.

In a democratic state, where all government institutions are constituted by popular elections or through appointment by an elected body, disagreement between institutions may arise from conflicting institutional identities, fostered by differing internal power structures, decision-making processes or appointment procedures.[20] To continue the example of a bicameral parliament, members of the upper house of the United States Congress are each elected by the entire people of one federal state; whereas each member of its lower house is elected by their electoral district, a smaller and more localized constituency. A member representing a larger and more diverse base may require a broader coalition, composed of people with opposing interests, to win election, and is thus incentivized to moderate their stance; and vice versa.

One branch's efforts to prevent another branch from becoming supreme are thought to perpetually hinder any branch from imposing unduly severe measures on the governed. Immanuel Kant took this view, saying that "the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils,"[21] so long as they possess an appropriate constitution to pit opposing factions against each other.

Checks and balances are designed to maintain the system of separation of powers keeping each branch in its place. The idea is that it is not enough to separate the powers and guarantee their independence but the branches need to have the constitutional means to defend their own legitimate powers from the encroachments of the other branches.[22] Under this influence, it was implemented in 1787 in the Constitution of the United States separation of powers. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, citing Montesquieu, redefined the judiciary as a separately distinct branch of government with the legislative and the executive branches.[23][24] Before Hamilton, many colonists in the American colonies had adhered to British political ideas and conceived of government as divided into executive and legislative branches (with judges operating as appendages of the executive branch).[23]

James Madison wrote about checks and balances in Federalist No. 51. For Madison, no government would be necessary if men were angels, but since men must govern men, the challenge is to have a government control both the governed and itself. While the government is primarily controlled by its dependence on the public, other precautions are necessary. Having rival interests creates "the defect of better motives" in both private and public life, displayed in distributing power to make everybody's private interests defend public rights through checking each other.[25]

History

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Antiquity

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Polybius (Histories, Book 6, 11–13) described the Roman Republic as a mixed government ruled by the Roman Senate, Consuls and the Assemblies. Polybius explained the system of checks and balances in detail, crediting Lycurgus of Sparta with the first government of this kind.[26]

Tripartite system

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During the English Civil War, the parliamentarians viewed the English system of government as composed of three branches – the King, the House of Lords and the House of Commons – where the first should have executive powers only, and the latter two legislative powers. One of the first documents proposing a tripartite system of separation of powers was the Instrument of Government, written by the English general John Lambert in 1653, and soon adopted as the constitution of England for a few years during The Protectorate. The system comprised a legislative branch (the Parliament) and two executive branches, the English Council of State and the Lord Protector, all being elected (though the Lord Protector was elected for life) and having checks upon each other.[27]

A further development in English thought was the idea that the judicial powers should be separated from the executive branch. This followed the use of the juridical system by the Crown to prosecute opposition leaders following the Restoration, in the late years of Charles II and during the short reign of James II (namely, during the 1680s).[28]

John Locke's legislative, executive, and federative powers

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John Locke

An earlier forerunner to Montesquieu's tripartite system was articulated by John Locke in his work Two Treatises of Government (1690).[29] In the Two Treatises, Locke distinguished between legislative, executive, and federative power. Locke defined legislative power as having "the right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed" (Second Treatise, § 143), while executive power entailed the "execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force" (Second Treatise, § 144). Locke further distinguished federative power, which entailed "the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with all persons and communities without [outside] the commonwealth" (Second Treatise, § 145), or what is now known as foreign policy. Locke distinguishes between separate powers, but not between discretely separate institutions, and notes that one body or person can share in two or more of the powers.[30] For instance, Locke noted that while the executive and federative powers are different, they are often combined in a single institution (Second Treatise, § 148).

Locke believed that the legislative power was supreme over the executive and federative powers, which are subordinate.[31] Locke reasoned that the legislative was supreme because it has law-giving authority; "[F]or what can give laws to another, must need to be superior to him" (Second Treatise, § 150). According to Locke, legislative power derives its authority from the people, who have the right to make and unmake the legislature. He argues that once people consent to be governed by laws, only those representatives they have chosen can create laws on their behalf, and they are bound solely by laws enacted by these representatives.[32]

Locke maintained that there are restrictions on the legislative power. Locke says that the legislature cannot govern arbitrarily, cannot levy taxes, or confiscate property without the consent of the governed (cf. "No taxation without representation"), and cannot transfer its law-making powers to another body, known as the nondelegation doctrine (Second Treatise, § 142).

Montesquieu's system

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Image
Montesquieu

The term "tripartite system" is commonly ascribed to French Enlightenment political philosopher Montesquieu, although he did not use such a term but referred to the "distribution" of powers. In The Spirit of Law (1748),[33] Montesquieu described the various forms of distribution of political power among a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. Montesquieu's approach was to present and defend a form of government whose powers were not excessively centralized in a single monarch or similar ruler (a form known then as "aristocracy"). He based this model on the Constitution of the Roman Republic and the British constitutional system. Montesquieu took the view that the Roman Republic had powers separated so that no one could usurp complete power.[34][35][36] In the British constitutional system, Montesquieu discerned a separation of powers among the monarch, Parliament, and the courts of law.[37]

In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.

By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.

Montesquieu argues that each Power should only exercise its own functions, or "there would be an end to everything". If the same person or body of magistrates held legislative and executive powers, liberty would be lost since the same monarch or senate could both enact and execute tyrannical laws. Similarly, a political entity holding both judiciary and legislative powers would exert arbitrary control over subjects, and one holding both judiciary and executive powers would be oppressive.[38]

Separation of powers requires a different source of legitimization, or a different act of legitimization from the same source, for each of the separate powers. If the legislative branch appoints the executive and judicial powers, as Montesquieu indicated, there will be no separation or division of its powers, since the power to appoint carries with it the power to revoke. Executive power would be given to a monarch, as that branch's need to be quick is best fulfilled by one, while legislative power is better regulated by many. If executive power were given to selected members of the legislation rather than the monarch, liberty would be lost since the members would always be able to have both powers.[39]

Theories of division of state power

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There are different theories about how to differentiate the functions of the state (or types of government power), so that they may be distributed among multiple structures of government (usually called branches of government, or arms).[40] There are analytical theories that provide a conceptual lens through which to understand the separation of powers as realized in real-world governments (developed by the academic discipline of comparative government); there are also normative theories,[41] both of political philosophy and constitutional law, meant to propose a reasoned (not conventional or arbitrary) way to separate powers. Disagreement arises between various normative theories in particular about what is the (desirable, in the case of political philosophy, or prescribed, in the case of legal studies) allocation of functions to specific governing bodies or branches of government.[42] How to correctly or usefully delineate and define the 'state functions' is another major point of contention.[43]

A government with a high degree of separation stands in contrast to systems where one person or branch plays a significant part in the exercise of more than one function (i.e. fusion of powers) or when one branch holds unlimited state power (i.e. unified power) and delegates its powers to other organs as it sees fit, as is the case in communist states.

Branches of government

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Legislation

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The function of the legislative branch of government broadly consists of authoritatively issuing binding rules.

Legislation is regarded as one of the three main functions of government, which are often distinguished under the doctrine of the separation of powers. Those who have the formal power to create legislation are known as legislators; a judicial branch of government will have the formal power to interpret legislation (see statutory interpretation); the executive branch of government can act only within the powers and limits set by the law, which is the instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established.[44]

Some political systems follow the principle of legislative supremacy, which holds that the legislature is the supreme branch of government and cannot be bound by other institutions, such as the judicial branch or a written constitution. Such a system renders the legislature more powerful.

Legislatures will sometimes delegate their legislative power to administrative or executive agencies.[45]

Execution

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The executive is the part of the government that executes or enforces the law and policy of a government. The function of the executive branch of government includes many exercises of powers in fact, whether in carrying into effect legal decisions or affecting the real world on its own initiative. Separation of executive and legislative branches (mitigated by checks and balances) is the main principle in presidential systems and to some degree in semi-presidential governments.[46][47]

The executive can also be the source of certain types of law or law-derived rules, such as a decree, executive order, or delegated legislation. For example, the U.S. federal legislative branch frequently delegates rulemaking (creation of regulations) to the U.S. federal executive branch.[48]

Adjudication

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The function of the judicial branch of government is the binding application of legal rules to a particular case, which usually involves creatively interpreting and developing these rules.

Separation of judicial powers from the executive and legislative branches is the norm in modern democracies.[49][50]

Fusion of powers also used to be present between the judiciary and the legislature (with parliamentary supremacy), as the House of Lords acted as final court of appeal, until the establishment of the Supreme Court, which introduced a stricter separation of powers to the British system.[51][52]

Electoral

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The function of an electoral branch of government is the oversight of the process surrounding elections, typically to the other branches of government. This may include electoral boundary delimitation or the administration of an election. In some governments such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, it forms its own distinct branch, while in others it may be fused variably into the executive, judicial, or legislative branches.

Auditory

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The function of an auditory branch of government is to monitor the performance of the government in its operation. In Taiwan, the Control Yuan forms its own branch of government tasked with the oversight and auditing of the government, and holds the ability to impeach public officials for misconduct. In other nations these functions may be fused under the legislative branch, such as in the United States where the Government Accountability Office performs auditing while the House of Representatives and Senate oversee the process of impeachment.

Investigative or prosecutorial functions are often performed by officers with names like ombudsman, procurator, prosecutor, attorney general, or censor, with branch or department names like procuratorate and censorate. For example, in the United States, Georgia's attorney general is a constitutionally independent and directly elected officer.

Criticism of separation and 'checks and balances'

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British constitutional expert Walter Bagehot criticised separation of powers, while praising the fusion of executive and legislative powers as the "efficient secret" of the Westminster system:[53]

"The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers. No doubt by the traditional theory, as it exists in all the books, the goodness of our constitution consists in the entire separation of the legislative and executive authorities, but in truth its merit consists in their singular approximation."

Thomas Paine wrote about separation and check and balances in Common Sense. According to Paine, two houses on behalf of the king and the people respectively creates a house divided against itself. While "pleasantly arranged", this system will end up being dominated by the power made strongest in the constitution. Other powers can check its speed, but they will be ineffectual if they cannot stop it.[54] Importantly, Paine rejected the theory that English liberty was secured by constitutionally guaranteed checks and balances. He denounced the whole notion of checks and balances, at least as far as the English constitution was concerned, in that "it is wholly owing to the constitution of the people and not to the constitution of the government that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey."[55]

Marx believed what he perceived as the modern constitutions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie invested too much power in the executive at the expense of the legislature. For example, he criticised the French Constitution of 1848 for replacing the hereditary monarchy with an elected monarch in the form of the president of the republic.[56] That is, Marx believed the separation of powers increased the president's power at the expense of the popularly elected legislature, concluding that the 1848 constitution had created a system with "two heads [...] the Legislative Assembly, on the one hand, the President, on the other."[56]

Thomas Hobbes also strongly oppose separation of powers.[citation needed]

Sartori argued against separation of powers:[57] "Dispersal of power among executive and legislature easily becomes a messy and wasteful confusion of power"

Checks and balances, such as veto rights in a separation of powers systems can result in gridlock when veto players in each of the branches are not aligned.[58]

Examples

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United States

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The American form of separation of powers is associated with a system of checks and balances. Montesquieu's philosophy heavily influenced the Founding Fathers of the United States and thereby the United States Constitution, according to which the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the United States government are kept distinct to prevent abuse of power.

Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, who participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which drafted the Constitution argued for separation of powers in the Federalist.

Some U.S. states did not observe a strict separation of powers in the 18th century.[citation needed] In New Jersey, the governor also functioned as a member of the state's highest court and as the presiding officer of one house of the New Jersey Legislature. The president of Delaware was a member of the Court of Appeals; the presiding officers of the two houses of the state legislature also served in the executive department as vice presidents. In both Delaware and Pennsylvania, members of the executive council served at the same time as judges. On the other hand, many southern states explicitly required the separation of powers. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia all kept the branches of government "separate and distinct."

Brazil

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The Constitution of Brazil, in its second article, establishes that there are three "powers of the Union, independent and harmonic, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary".[59]

Hybrids of separation and fusion of powers

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Some forms of government combine separation and fusion of legislative executive powers in different ways.

In an assembly-independent republic, the executive is elected by the legislature (fusion) but, once in office, is not politically accountable to it and cannot be removed through a vote of no confidence (separation). In comparative politics, this institutional arrangement is commonly described as assembly-independent government, referring to systems that combine legislative election of the executive with its independence from parliamentary dismissal.[60][61][62] They may or may not also hold a seat in the legislature.

In a semi-presidential republic a president exists alongside a prime minister and a cabinet, with the latter two being responsible to the legislature (fusion). It differs from a parliamentary system in that it has an executive president independent from the legislature (separation); and from the presidential system in that the cabinet, although named by the president, is responsible to the legislature, which may force the cabinet to resign through a motion of no confidence.[63][64][65][66]

A semi-parliamentary system is a system of government in which the legislature is split into two parts that are both directly elected – the first chamber has the power to select and remove the members of the executive by a vote of no confidence (fusion), while the second chamber does not (separation).[67]

Under dualistic parliamentary forms of government, where the membership of the legislative and executive powers cannot overlap, however, as part of the parliamentary structure, fusion is still the dominant relation between the two branches.[68] Examples include Sweden and the Netherlands.[69]

Australia

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Australia has a partially Westminster-derived variation on the parliamentary system in which the executive branch is entirely composed of members of the legislative branch (monism).[70] Government ministers are required to be members of parliament, which is an element of fusion — but the federal judiciary strictly guards its independence from the other two branches.[71] However, the system can be described as semi-parliamentary in that only the House of Representatives has confidence powers (fusion), while the Senate represents an aspect of separation of powers.[67] The system has also been named a "Washminster" variation for this reason.

France

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The current French Fifth Republic provides an example of the fusion of powers from a country that does not follow the Westminster system. Rather France follows a model known alternatively as a semi-presidential system[63] or 'mixed presidential-parliamentary' system, which is a variation on parliamentary democracy and with a significant role played by the president in the executive branch.[65]

Japan

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Under the Constitution of Japan, a majority of cabinet ministers, including the prime minister, must be members of the National Diet. The system can be described as semi-parliamentary in that only the House of Representatives has confidence powers (fusion), while the House of Councillors represents an aspect of separation of powers.[67]

See also

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Notes

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Citation footnotes

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  1. ↑ Waldron 2013, pp. 457–458.
  2. ↑ Waldron 2013, pp. 459–460.
  3. ↑ Levy, Jacob T. (2025), "The Separation of Powers", in King, Jeff; Bellamy, Richard (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory, Cambridge University Press, pp. 279–296, ISBN 978-1-108-49131-0
  4. ↑ Richard Benwell and Oonagh Gay. "The Separation of Powers" (PDF).
  5. ↑ Takahashi, Kazuyuki (1990). "Contemporary Democracy in a Parliamentary System". Law and Contemporary Problems. 53 (1): 105–122. doi:10.2307/1191830. JSTOR 1191830.
  6. ↑ Needler, Martin (30 January 1991). The Concepts of Comparative Politics. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-0-275-93653-2.
  7. 1 2 Shugart, Matthew Søberg (2005-12). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns". French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087. ISSN 1476-3419. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  8. ↑ Richard Benwell and Oonagh Gay. "The Separation of Powers" (PDF).
  9. ↑ "Fusion of powers (UK)".
  10. ↑ Ganghof, S (May 2018). "A new political system model: Semi-parliamentary government". European Journal of Political Research. 57 (2): 261–281. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12224.
  11. ↑ Holm, Fredrik (1997) Primus inter pares? An institutional comparison of the Office of Prime Minister. Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden and Denmark
  12. ↑ Shugart, Matthew S. (2 September 2009), Binder, Sarah A.; Rhodes, R. A. W.; Rockman, Bert A. (eds.), "Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations", The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (1 ed.), Oxford University Press, pp. 344–365, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0018, ISBN 978-0-19-954846-0, retrieved 19 October 2026{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  13. ↑ Levy, Jacob T. (2025), "The Separation of Powers", in King, Jeff; Bellamy, Richard (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory, Cambridge University Press, pp. 279–296, ISBN 978-1-108-49131-0
  14. ↑ For the case of the United States constitution: Kurland 1986, p. 593
  15. ↑ Vile 1967, p. 18.
  16. ↑ Vile 1967, pp. 2–3.
  17. ↑ Vile 1967, pp. 33–34.
  18. ↑ Vile 1967, pp. 120–121.
  19. ↑ Vile 1967, pp. 71–72.
  20. ↑ Magill 2000, pp. 1170–72.
  21. ↑ Kant, Immanuel (1971). "Perpetual Peace". In Reiss, Hans (ed.). Political Writings. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 112–13. ISBN 9781107268364.
  22. ↑ "The Federalist No 48". Avalon Project. Yale University. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  23. 1 2 Wood, Gordon S. (2018). "Comment". In Scalia, Antonin (ed.). A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 49–64. doi:10.2307/j.ctvbj7jxv.6. Retrieved 12 December 2020.
  24. ↑ The Strengths of the Weakest Arm. Australian Bar Association Conference. Florence, Italy. 2 July 2004. Archived from the original on 22 August 2023. Retrieved 22 August 2023.
  25. ↑ James, Madison. "Federalist No. 51". The Avalon Project. Yale University. Retrieved 24 March 2018.
  26. ↑ Polibius. (~150 B.C.). The Rise of the Roman Empire. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (1979). Penguin Classics. London, England.
  27. ↑ Vile, Maurice J. C. (April 2008). "The Separation of Powers". In Greene, Jack P.; Pole, J. R. (eds.). A companion to the American Revolution. Wiley (Blackwell imprint). pp. 686–690. doi:10.1002/9780470756454.ch87. ISBN 978-0-470-75644-7.
  28. ↑ Marshall J. (2013). Whig Thought and the Revolution of 1688–91. In: Harris, T., & Taylor, S. (Eds.). (2015). The final crisis of the Stuart monarchy: the revolutions of 1688–91 in their British, Atlantic and European contexts, Chapter 3. Boydell & Brewer.
  29. ↑ Kurland 1986, p. 595.
  30. ↑ Tuckness, Alex (2002). "Institutional Roles, Legislative View". Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law. Princeton University Press. p. 133. ISBN 0691095043.
  31. ↑ Tuckness, Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law, at p. 126
  32. ↑ Locke, John (1824). Two Treatises of Government. C. and J. Rivington. p. 215.
  33. ↑ "Esprit des lois (1777)/L11/C6 - Wikisource". fr.wikisource.org (in French). Retrieved 11 March 2018.
  34. ↑ Price, Sara (22 February 2011), The Roman Republic in Montesquieu and Rousseau – Abstract, SSRN 1766947
  35. ↑ Schindler, Ronald, Montesquieu's Political Writings, archived from the original on 12 October 2013, retrieved 19 November 2012
  36. ↑ Lloyd, Marshall Davies (22 September 1998), Polybius and the Founding Fathers: the separation of powers, retrieved 17 November 2012
  37. ↑ Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. by Thomas Nugent, revised ed. (New York: Colonial Press, 1899), Book 11, s. 6, pp. 151–162 at 151.
  38. ↑ Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, at pp. 151–52.
  39. ↑ Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, at p. 156.
  40. ↑ Möllers 2019, p. 239: "The modern theory of separated powers [...] addresses the necessary or possible relations between [institutional] actors and their normative 'functions'. Legislation, execution of laws and adjudication are 'functions' that the states or other public authorities fulfil and that are carried out by respective 'branches'. In this context, the notion of 'function' refers to different types of legally relevant actions."
  41. ↑ On this distinction, see Möllers 2019, p. 231.
  42. ↑ Möllers 2019, p. 234.
  43. ↑ Möllers 2019, p. 240.
  44. ↑ Martin C. Needler (1991). The Concepts of Comparative Politics. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 116. ISBN 978-0-275-93653-2.
  45. ↑ Schoenbrod, David (2008). "Delegation". In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE; Cato Institute. pp. 117–18. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n74. ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN 2008009151. OCLC 750831024.
  46. ↑ Shugart, Matthew Søberg; Carey, John M. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. p. 26.
  47. ↑ Shugart, Matthew Søberg (December 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns". French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087.
  48. ↑ "Legislative Branch". Regulatory Studies Center, Columbian College of Arts & Sciences. The George Washington University. Retrieved 7 February 2026.
  49. ↑ Richard Benwell and Oonagh Gay. "The Separation of Powers" (PDF).
  50. ↑ KAZUYUKI, TAKAHASHI. "Contemporary democracy in a parliamentary system".
  51. ↑ "Parliamentary sovereignty". Parliament of the United Kingdom. Retrieved 29 January 2012.
  52. ↑ "Fusion of powers (UK)".
  53. ↑ "The Project Gutenberg E-text of The English Constitution, by Walter Bagehot". www.gutenberg.org. Retrieved 19 October 2026.
  54. ↑ Paine, Thomas (1776). "Republican Government: On the Origin and Design of Government in General, With Concise Remarks on the English Constitution". Common Sense.
  55. ↑ Kuklick, Bruce (2018). Thomas Paine. Taylor & Francis.
  56. 1 2 Leipold 2020, p. 182.
  57. ↑ Sartori, Giovanni (1994). Comparative constitutional engineering: an inquiry into structures, incentives, and outcomes. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 978-0-8147-7974-3.
  58. ↑ Krehbiel, Keith (1996). "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government". Journal of Theoretical Politics. 8 (1): 7–40. doi:10.1177/0951692896008001002. ISSN 0951-6298. Retrieved 20 August 2026.
  59. ↑ https://web.archive.org/web/20211202201342/https://constituicao.stf.jus.br/dispositivo/cf-88-parte-1-titulo-1-artigo-2
  60. ↑ Ganghof, Steffen (2017). "A new political system model: Semi-parliamentary government". European Journal of Political Research. 57 (2): 261–281. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12224.
  61. ↑ Shugart, Matthew Søberg; Carey, John M. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press. p. 26.
  62. ↑ Shugart, Matthew Søberg (December 2005). "Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns". French Politics. 3 (3): 323–351. doi:10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087.
  63. 1 2 Duverger (1980). "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government". European Journal of Political Research (quarterly). 8 (2): 165–187. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00569.x. The concept of a semi-presidential form of government, as used here, is defined only by the content of the constitution. A political regime is considered semi-presidential if the constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them.
  64. ↑ Veser, Ernst [in German] (1997). "Semi-Presidentialism-Duverger's concept: A New Political System Model" (PDF). Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences. 11 (1): 39–60. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 February 2017. Retrieved 21 August 2016.
  65. 1 2 Duverger, Maurice (September 1996). "Les monarchies républicaines" [The Republican Monarchies] (PDF). Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques (in French). No. 78. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. pp. 107–120. ISBN 2-02-030123-7. ISSN 0152-0768. OCLC 909782158. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 10 September 2016.{{cite magazine}}: CS1 maint: periodical has ISBN (link)
  66. ↑ Bahro, Horst; Bayerlein, Bernhard H.; Veser, Ernst [in German] (October 1998). "Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited". European Journal of Political Research (quarterly). 34 (2): 201–224. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00405. S2CID 153349701. The conventional analysis of government in democratic countries by political science and constitutional law starts from the traditional types of presidentialism and parliamentarism. There is, however, a general consensus that governments in the various countries work quite differently. This is why some authors have inserted distinctive features into their analytical approaches, at the same time maintaining the general dichotomy. Maurice Duverger, trying to explain the French Fifth Republic, found that this dichotomy was not adequate for this purpose. He therefore resorted to the concept of 'semi-presidential government': The characteristics of the concept are (Duverger 1974: 122, 1978: 28, 1980: 166):
    1. the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage,
    2. he possesses quite considerable powers and
    3. he has opposite him a prime minister who possesses executive and governmental powers and can stay in office only if parliament does not express its opposition to him.
  67. 1 2 3 Ganghof, S (May 2018). "A new political system model: Semi-parliamentary government". European Journal of Political Research. 57 (2): 261–281. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12224.
  68. ↑ Zaken, Ministerie van Algemene (12 October 2011). "Relationship between government and parliament | Government.nl". www.government.nl. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. Retrieved 19 October 2026.
  69. ↑ Holm, Fredrik (1997) Primus inter pares? An institutional comparison of the Office of Prime Minister. Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden and Denmark
  70. ↑ "Chapter 2". Parliament of Australia. Archived from the original on 2 October 2017. Retrieved 2 October 2017.
  71. ↑ See Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth [1951] HCA 5, AustLII[permanent dead link]

Works cited

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Further reading

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