North Korea is targeting npm maintainers -- not for crypto, but for write access to packages downloaded trillions of times a year.
Several Socket engineers were targeted in this campaign -- myself, Jordan Harband, John-David D., and others. None of us fell for the bait. Unfortunately, the axios maintainer did. No shame in that -- these aren't phishing emails. They're weeks-long ops with fake companies, fake Slack workspaces, and spoofed meeting platforms built with realistic Zoom/Teams interfaces using the official SDKs for realism.
Other confirmed targets: Matteo Collina (Fastify, Pino, Undici, Node.js TSC Chair), Wesley Todd (Express TC), Pelle Wessman (mocha, neostandard).
The common thread? High-trust maintainers with publish access to packages that sit deep in everyone's dependency tree.
The attack chain: build rapport over weeks, schedule a video call, fake an audio error, prompt the target to install a "fix." That fix is a RAT. Once it's on your machine, they have your .npmrc tokens, browser sessions, AWS creds, keychain. 2FA doesn't matter. OIDC publishing doesn't matter. Game over.
Security researcher @tayvano_ linked this to UNC1069, a DPRK-nexus group Mandiant has tracked since 2018. Their reasoning is brutal in its simplicity: why social engineer one rich person when you can compromise one maintainer and reach millions of machines?
This is the threat model now. If you maintain popular packages, act accordingly. If you use open source (and you certainly do), act accordingly.
Full writeup: https://lnkd.in/dsjmBcvg