Introduction
Long regarded as one of Southern Africa’s most professional militaries, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) continues to consistently punch above its weight. Established in 1977 in response to an increasingly unstable region, the BDF comprises three distinct commands: the Botswana Ground Force Command, the Air Arm Command, and the Defence Logistics Command. While fielding only around 10 000 personnel, the BDF has earned a reputation for discipline and competence in peacekeeping and internal security operations.
Consistently high levels of defence spending (approximately 2.5% to 3% of GDP) have enabled Botswana to maintain a modestly capable, well-equipped, and modern force, with recent acquisitions including advanced air defence systems and modern armoured vehicles. In this regard, Botswana maintains strong defence partnerships with the US and France, as well as a somewhat close relationship with Israel. Although the Air Arm’s fleet is ageing, recent donations from the US have revitalised key transport capabilities. Professional, capable, and trusted, the BDF remains a dependable and responsible regional security actor.
Overview
| Head of State and Government: | Duma Gideon Boko (since 2024) |
| Vice President: | Ndaba Nkosinathi Gaolathe (since 2024) |
| Minister of Defence: | Abolished; Ministry of Defence moved into the Presidency following 2024 elections |
| Minister for State President: | Moeti Caesar Mohwasa (since 2024) |
| Commander of the Botswana Defence Forces: | Lieutenant General Placid Diratsagae Segokgo (since 2016) |
| Deputy Commander of the BDF: | Major General Joseph Seelo (since 2023) |
| Commander of the Ground Forces: | Major General Simon Motswana Barwabatsile (since 2023) |
| Commander of the Air Arm: | Major General Hendrick Thuthu Rakgantswana (since 2021) |
| Capital(s): | Gaborone |
| International Organisation Membership: |
United Nations (UN); African Union (AU); Southern African Development Community (SADC); The Commonwealth; International Criminal Court (ICC); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Southern African Customs Union (SACU); Etc. |
| Signatory to: |
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT); The Rome Statute; Pelindaba Treaty (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty); Ottawa Treaty/Mine Ban Treaty (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention); Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT); Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW); Etc. |
| Parliamentary Oversight: | Portfolio Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Security & Government Assurances |
Structure:
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). He acts either directly or through the Defence Council, the members of which he appoints. Until 2024, the BDF fell under the Ministry of Defence and Security and its Minister of Defence. Following the 2024 elections, the Department of Defence (and by extension, the BDF) was moved into the Presidency. The Commander of the Botswana Defence Force, as well as all officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, are appointed by the President. The BDF has three distinct commands: Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, and Defence Logistics Command.
Military Service Age, Demographics, and Obligation Status:
The Botswana Defence Force is a volunteer force recruiting both men and women between the ages of 18 and 24 for general recruits; 18 to 40 for ‘Special Entrant Officers’; and 18 to 23 for ‘Officer Cadets.’
Symbols
National Flag
National Coat of Arms
Defence Force Flag
Defence Force Emblem
Air Arm Roundel
Order of Battle
| Service | Personnel |
|---|---|
| Army | ~8,500–9,000 |
| Air Force | ~500–1,000 |
| Total | ~10,000 |
| *Best efforts were taken to ensure the reliability of the Order of Battle figures; however, figures are approximations due to a lack of available and officially published information. | |
| Category | Type | Quantity / Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Armour (Light) | SK-105 Kurassier | ~20–50 |
| FV101 Scorpion | 25 | |
| Reconnaissance | RAM-V-2 | 8 |
| VBL | 64 | |
| IFV | Piranha UT-25 | 45 |
| APC | FV103 Spartan | 6 |
| BTR-60 | 50 | |
| LAV-150 | 50 | |
| Piranha III | 45 | |
| Self-Propelled Artillery | Atmos 2000 155mm* | 2+ |
| Towed Artillery | L-118 LG 105mm | 12 |
| Model 56 105mm | 6 | |
| Soltam M71 155mm | 12 | |
| Multiple Rocket Launcher | Aerostar SA 122mm | 20 |
| Mortar | 81mm | 22 |
| 120mm | 6 | |
| Anti-Armour | TOW | 6 |
| Milan | (number of launchers unclear) | |
| Recoilless Rifle | Carl Gustav (84mm) | ~30 |
| Air Defence Missile | Javelin | 1+ |
| Mistral (portable) | ~140 | |
| MICA-VL | 1 | |
| SA-7 | (status unclear) | |
| SA-14 / Strela-3 (9P58M) | 20 | |
| Air Defence Missile | SA-16 | (status unclear) |
| Air Defence Gun | M-167 Vulcan | ~7 |
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | Glenn Valley, Gaborone |
| Regular Forces by Role |
2: Infantry brigade 1: Commando battalion 1: Presidential Guard company 1: Armoured brigade (2 regiments) 2: Field artillery brigade (3 regiments each) 1: Air defence artillery brigade (2 regiments) 1: Engineer regiment |
| Supporting Corps |
Logistics corps Signal corps Intelligence corps Medical corps Ordnance corps Armament corps |
| Training | Force Training School |
| Category | Type | Quantity/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Combat Aircraft | CF-5A Freedom Fighter | ~8 |
| CF-5D Tiger II | ~6 | |
| Trainer Aircraft | PC-7 Mk II Turbo | 5 |
| Transport Aircraft | C-130B Hercules | 3 (storage/grounded) |
| C-130H Hercules | 1 | |
| BN-2 Defender | 10 | |
| C-212 Aviocar | 3 | |
| CN235M-300 | 2 | |
| Dornier Do 328 | 1 | |
| Surveillance | Bat Hawk | 6 |
| Ultralight | Aviatika 890U | Status unclear |
| VIP | Beech 200 King Air | 1 |
| BD-700 Global Express / Global 5000 | 1 | |
| PC-24 | 1 | |
| Transport Helicopter | EC225LP Super Puma Mk II | 1 |
| Bell 412 | ~6 | |
| AS350B Écureuil | 7 |
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | Gaborone |
| Air Bases |
Thebephatshwa Air Base (only full/exclusive airbase) Sir Seretse Khama International Airport (VIP aircraft) Francistown joint civilian/military airport |
| Combat Squadron(s) | 1: Squadron with BF-5A and BF-5D (Z28 at Thebephatshwa) |
| Surveillance / Ultralight | 1: Squadron with Bat Hawk (Z3 at Francistown) |
| Transport Squadron(s) |
2: Squadrons with C-212, CN235M, C-130B/H (Z10 at Thebephatshwa) BN-2 (Z12 at Francistown) |
| Trainer Squadron(s) | 1: Squadron with PC-7 Mk IIs (Z7 at Thebephatshwa) |
| Helicopter Squadron(s) | 2: Squadrons with AS350 and Bell 412 (Z21 and Z23 at Thebephatshwa) |
| VIP Squadron(s) | 1: Squadron with Beech 200 King Air, BD-700 Global Express / Global 5000, PC-24, Bell 412 |
Defence Economics
| Botswanan Defence Spending | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Botswanan Pula, BWP billion) | |||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Defence Spending | 3.80 | 4.09 | 6.11 | 5.30 | 5.48 | 5.70 | 6.17 | 5.98 | 6.17 | 6.50 | 8.00 |
| Average USD Exchange Rate | 9.09 | 10.41 | 10.73 | 10.19 | 10.29 | 10.71 | 11.51 | 11.24 | 12.46 | 13.39 | 13.55 |
| Botswanan Defence Spending in USD | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (USD, million) | |||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Defence Spending (million) | 417.77 | 392.71 | 569.59 | 520.43 | 531.93 | 531.64 | 534.00 | 531.75 | 494.71 | 484.74 | 590.00 |
| GDP (billion) | 15.47 | 13.53 | 15.08 | 16.11 | 17.03 | 16.70 | 14.93 | 18.75 | 20.32 | 19.41 | 19.36 |
| Defence Spending as % of GDP | 2.70% | 2.90% | 3.78% | 3.23% | 3.12% | 3.18% | 3.59% | 2.84% | 2.43% | 2.50% | 3.05% |
Botswana Arms Control
Botswana’s conventional arms control regime is based on a mix of domestic legislation and international treaties and conventions. Unlike its southern neighbour, South Africa, Botswana does not currently have a dedicated entity responsible for implementing its military or heavy arms control policies, or for ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
At present, Botswana’s arms control regime is rooted in the Arms and Ammunition Act (No. 19 of 2018), a law introduced regulate small arms and ammunition as well as to better align Botswana’s domestic arms control framework with its international commitments under the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, and the SADC Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials.
While the Act defines “arms of war” separately as “apparatus for the discharge of all kinds of projectiles, explosive or gas-diffusing, flame-throwers, bombs, grenades, machine-guns, and rifled small-bore breech-loading weapons or such arms as may be prescribed,” it fails to introduce any specific regulation of such weapons. There are no clauses mandating end-use verification, transit permits, or recordkeeping for arms of war. Instead, the legislation operationalises control over small arms, ammunition, and civilian ownership, something critical for internal crime prevention and for meeting the aforementioned treaty and convention obligations. However, it fails to adequately fulfil Botswana’s obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty, the principal international agreement on the regulation of conventional/heavy arms.
Botswana ratified the ATT in 2019. While the implementation of the treaty has been relatively slow, Botswana has made some progress towards compliance. Although Botswana initially failed to submit its initial report in 2020 as expected, it managed to do so in 2021. Since then, government representatives have reiterated their continued commitment to full compliance, though little meaningful progress has been evident.
However, in August 2025, the Botswana government took a significant step towards full compliance by tabling the new Conventional Arms Control Bill in Parliament. Notably, the Bill’s tabling coincides with the government’s expressed interest in fostering the development of a domestic defence industry. It is principally aimed at ensuring Botswana’s full compliance with its ATT obligations and other international norms.
If passed, the Bill is expected to establish a legal framework and national control systems for the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms, as required by the ATT and Botswana’s other international commitments, this according to Botswana’s Minister for State President, Mr Moeti Mohwasa. The Bill is expected to establish a National Conventional Arms Control Authority (NCACA), similar to South Africa’s National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), as well as set out the requirements for reporting, permit approvals and denials, including mandatory end-user certification as well as a range of additional measures to ensure Botswana’s safe and responsible participation in the international conventional arms trade.
Defence Industry & Partners
Botswana has no significant defence industrial capabilities to speak of, although the country does possess a small maintenance capability. As such, Botswana is effectively wholly dependent on foreign military suppliers and imports to meet the needs of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF).
Relatedly, the BDF’s stockpile consists of arms and weapons platforms of diverse origins. The BDF currently utilises various British, American, Israeli, French, Swiss, and Soviet-era systems to meet its defensive and operational needs. As a result, Botswana has entered into several defence agreements with major foreign defence companies as part of ongoing maintenance and force modernisation programmes. One example is the Swiss defence manufacturer Mowag, which supplied the BDF with 45 Piranha IIIs in the early 2000s, with an additional 45 Piranhas ordered in 2016 and delivered in batches into the early 2020s.
Botswana has also procured French surface-to-air missile systems as part of a larger €300 million contract in 2016. More recently, the United States donated a C-130H medium-lift transport aircraft to Botswana in 2024. Interestingly, Botswana also maintains a relatively close (albeit limited) defence relationship with Israel, having procured a range of Israeli-produced weaponry, ranging from small arms and light weapons to major defence systems such as the ATMOS 2000 and Soltam M-71 155mm artillery systems.
In addition to defence procurement, Botswana maintains strong defence ties with a range of regional and international partners. The United States, in particular, is a key defence and security partner for Botswana and the BDF, with the two countries regularly participating in joint military exercises and training initiatives. There are also reports of the two countries’ militaries working closely together to modernise the BDF’s strategic practices and doctrine. Botswana also regularly takes part in SADC-led military exercises, as well as biennial exercises with neighbouring Namibia.
It should be noted that, as of 2025, the Botswana government, through President Duma Boko, has expressed a renewed interest in establishing and maintaining a local defence industry in order to enhance the country’s indigenous defence capabilities and reduce its overreliance on foreign suppliers in the defence and security sector. However, the establishment and sustainability of a domestic defence industry is likely to be hampered by the small size of the BDF (as its primary customer) as well as Botswana’s continued fiscal constraints.
State of Military Forces
The Botswana Defence Force (BDF), while small, is one of Southern Africa’s most capable and professional armed forces, benefitting from a consistently (and relatively) large defence budget. The BDF was established in 1977, some eleven years after Botswana gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. It was created, in part, due to growing regional instability, most notably the Rhodesian Bush War, and increased tensions with apartheid-era South Africa.
The BDF consists of three distinct commands. The first and largest is the Ground Forces Command, the second is the Air Arm Command, and the third and smallest is the Logistics Command. The Ground Forces form the backbone of the BDF and hold primary responsibility for combat operations. While traditionally an infantry-focused force, its capabilities have been modestly expanded through the acquisition of a small number of mechanised vehicles and more advanced artillery systems. Although Botswana is a landlocked nation, the BDF (under the Ground Forces Command) maintains a small maritime unit equipped with several patrol craft to maintain security on the country’s waterways and rivers. The Air Arm provides a vital but mainly supporting role through the provision of aerial reconnaissance, troop transport, and logistical support, though it does possess a modest (if ageing) combat capability through its CF-4 fleet.
The BDF saw its capabilities significantly improved in the 1990s following the procurement of several new armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and aircraft, as well as the construction and establishment of the country’s only dedicated air base at Thebephatshwa. This military build-up provoked some concerns from neighbouring countries, though these concerns ultimately proved inconsequential. Botswana is one of Africa’s most politically stable democracies, having never suffered a coup nor any significant military intervention in its politics.
Much of Botswana’s military equipment has begun to age, requiring more intensive maintenance and repairs, or in some cases has been rendered unserviceable. Recognising this issue, the BDF has embarked on a modest force modernisation programme over the past decade. This includes the procurement of a number of new armoured and light-armoured vehicles, a small number of new aircraft, as well as several French air defence systems.
The BDF’s primary duty is the safeguarding of Botswana’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Additionally, although the BDF has regularly taken part in international peacekeeping missions under the UN, AU, and SADC, it remains a largely inward-looking force. Domestically, the BDF is tasked with two principal responsibilities: disaster management and anti-poaching operations.
Country Threat Report
| Threat Type | Overview |
|---|---|
| External |
• Botswana is currently not facing any military threat from an external state actor. • Political tensions regarding water management—particularly around the governance of the Okavango Delta—persist between Angola, Namibia, and Botswana. |
| Internal |
• Botswana is currently facing no internally driven political security threats. • The country’s porous borders leave it vulnerable to the smuggling of illicit goods and wildlife poaching. • While still relatively rare, incidents of violent crime have been increasing in urban areas. |
| Regional |
• Intermittent political instability in Zimbabwe could affect Botswana’s security and foreign policies. • The ongoing economic crisis in Zimbabwe has led to significant regular and irregular migration into Botswana, placing strain on the country’s immigration system and contributing to periodic tensions and xenophobic incidents. • While Botswana’s immediate neighbours remain relatively stable, insecurity in regional states—such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique—could negatively affect Botswana by increasing refugee flows and facilitating the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. |
| Political |
• Botswana is considered politically stable, having held regular free and fair elections since independence. • Following the 2024 elections, Botswana experienced the first change of ruling party in its history as the long-dominant Botswana Democratic Party was defeated by the Umbrella for Democratic Change coalition. • The new government faces substantial expectations after years of economic discontent, perceived corruption, and governance failures. Failure to deliver on reforms could increase the risk of political instability and public dissatisfaction. • As a coalition composed of diverse ideological groups, internal political tensions could emerge and affect government cohesion and policy implementation. • Persistently high poverty and unemployment remain key drivers of public frustration. |
| Economic |
• Botswana’s economy is heavily dependent on revenue from natural and mineral resources, especially diamonds, making it highly vulnerable to global commodity price shocks. • A recent downturn in the international diamond market has resulted in significant fiscal strain and an economic contraction in 2024, with BMI/Fitch predicting another contraction in 2025. • Persistent budget deficits continue to increase public debt. • Botswana is a highly water-scarce country and is therefore particularly vulnerable to droughts and climate variability, which threaten agriculture, tourism, and national food security. |
External Deployments
| Operation | Country | Personnel |
|---|---|---|
| UN Peacekeeping (MONUSCO) |
Democratic Republic of the Congo | Staff Officer: 2 |
Military Exercises
| Level | Name | Participants | Force Involved | Last Held |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regional | Hanganee II | Botswana; Namibia | BDF | 2023 |
| Regional | Dipuisano | Botswana; South Africa; Lesotho; Namibia; Zambia; Tanzania; Zimbabwe; Democratic Republic of Congo; Angola; Malawi | Communications | 2023 |
| International | Southern Accord | Botswana; United States | BDF | 2024 |
| Joint Combined Exchange Training | Botswana; United States | BDF | 2024 | |
| Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX) | Botswana; India; Cameroon; Egypt; Equatorial Guinea; Eswatini; Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Malawi; Morocco; Niger; Nigeria; etc. | BDF | 2023 |
Sponsors
