Introduction
Large, fragmented, and ineffective, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have yet to stabilise the country’s conflict-ridden east despite various reforms and decades of international assistance. Established in its current form in 2003 through the integration of government and former rebel forces, the FARDC comprises three branches; the Land Forces (Army), the Air Force, and the Navy, as well as the Republican Guard, an elite unit reporting directly to the President.
With an estimated 130 000 active personnel, the FARDC remains heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the east of the country. Despite its size, the force’s effectiveness is severely constrained by chronic underfunding, weak command and control, limited logistical capacity, widespread corruption, and obsolete or unserviceable equipment. Ongoing reform and professionalisation efforts, backed by the United Nations and regional partners, have largely come to naught. As a result, the FARDC continues to struggle to fulfil its core mandate of safeguarding the country’s stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Overview
| Head of State and Government: | Felix Tshisekedi (since 2019) |
| Prime Minister: | Judith Suminwa (since 2024) |
| Minister of Defence: | Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita (since 2024) |
| Chief of the General Staff: | Lieutenant-General Jules Banza Mwilambwe (since 2024) |
| Land Forces Chief of Staff: | Maj‑Gen Christian Ndaywel (since 2024) |
| Navy Chief of Staff: | Vice Admiral Rombault Mbuayama Nsiona (2014) |
| Air Force Chief of Staff: | Air Brigadier General Franck Lebe Ngama (since 2021) |
| Capital(s): | Kinshasa |
| International Organisation Membership: |
United Nations (UN) and its agencies; African Union (AU); Southern African Development Community (SADC); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); International Criminal Court (ICC); International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR); Etc. |
| Signatory to: |
Treaty of Pelindaba (African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty); Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention/Ottawa Treaty (MBT); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW); Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); Central African Convention on Small Arms (Kinshasa Convention); Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM); Rome Statute; SADC Mutual Defence Pact; Etc. |
| Parliamentary Oversight: |
National Assembly: Permanent Commission on Defence and Security (Commission Défense et Sécurité); Senate: The Defence, Security and Borders Commission (Commission Défense, Sécurité et Frontières). |
Structure:
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC) and appoints the Chief of the General Staff. The FARDC falls under the Ministry of National Defence and Veterans Affairs, with its Minister and Vice-Minister. The Chief of the General Staff commands the FARDC, which comprises of three services; the Land Forces, Navy, and Air Force. Additionally, the FARDC includes a Republican Guard unit which reports directly to the President rather than the Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff overseas operations, intelligence, logistics, training, and personnel functions.
Symbols
National Flag
National Coat of Arms
Defence Force/Army Emblem
Air Force Emblem/Roundel
Navy Emblem
Order of Battle
| Service | Personnel |
|---|---|
| Army | ~115,000 |
| Air Force | ~2,500 |
| Navy | ~2,300 (including 600 marines) |
| Republican Guard | ~7,000 |
| Total | ~120-130,000 |
| *Best efforts were taken to ensure the reliability of the Order of Battle figures; however, figures are approximations due to a lack of available and officially published figures. | |
| Category | Type | Quantity/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Armour | Type-59 | ~16 |
| T-55 | 50 | |
| T-64BV-1 | 25 | |
| T-72 | 100 | |
| Type-62 | ~32 | |
| PT-76 | 10 | |
| Reconnaissance | AML-60 | 17 |
| AML-90 | 14 | |
| RAM-V-2 | <2 | |
| EE-9 Cascavel | 19 | |
| IFV | BMP-1 | 20 |
| APC | Maatla | ~25 (15 in service with DRC Police) |
| MT-LB | 6 | |
| BTR-60 | 70 | |
| BTR-50 | 3 | |
| MCAV-20 | 30 | |
| Mbombe 4 | 20 | |
| Hizir | Unknown (reports of 185 ordered, history of delays) | |
| Self-Propelled Artillery | 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm | 5-6 (received 18) |
| 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm | 12 | |
| MLRS | BM-21 122mm: 20; RM-70 122mm: at least 1; Type-63 107mm: 12; M-51 128mm: 6; Type-63 107mm: 1+ | |
| Towed Artillery | D-30 (M1938/Type-60) 122mm | ~75 |
| 152mm Howitzers (likely D-20) | 12 | |
| Type-59/M-46 | ~50 | |
| Mortar* | 81mm | 100 |
| 82mm | 303 | |
| M-43 120mm | 36 | |
| M-75 120mm | 60 | |
| Anti-Armour/Recoilless rifle | M-18 57mm | ~36 |
| M-20 75mm | ~10 | |
| Type-56 (Gun) 85mm | <20 | |
| M-40A1 106mm | 16 | |
| Air Defence Missile | SA-7 Grail (Strela-2) | 20 (status unclear) |
| Air Defence Gun | ZPU-4 14.5mm | 12 |
| M1939/Type 63 37mm | 40-52 |
| Category | Units / Areas |
|---|---|
| Military Zones* |
Each zone includes: • HQ with one commander and two deputy commanders • Administrative and logistics units • At least one military base Additionally, in times of conflict: • ‘Cover’ units • Rapid reaction unit • Main defence unit • Air units • Naval units • Medical units • Logistics unit Three Military Zones: 1st Military Zone: City of Kinshasa; Kwango, Kwilu, Mai-Ndombe, Central Kongo, Équateur, Mongala, North-Ubangi, South-Ubangi, Tshuapa provinces 2nd Military Zone: Kasai, Eastern Kasai, Central Kasai, Lomami, Sankuru, Upper-Lomami, Upper Katanga, Lualaba, Tanganyika provinces 3rd Military Zone: Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu, Bas-Uélé, Tshopo, Haut-Uélé, Ituri provinces |
| Military Regions |
Ten Military Regions: 11th military region: Kwango, Kwilu, Mai-Ndombe provinces 12th military region: Kongo Central province 13th military region: Equateur, Mongala, Nord-Ubangi, Sud-Ubangi, Tshuapa provinces 14th military region: Kinshasa city 21st military region: Kasai, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Central, Lomami, Sankuru provinces 22nd military region: Haut Lomami, Haut Katanga, Lualaba, Tanganyika provinces 31st military region: Bas-Uélé, Tshopo provinces 32nd military region: Haut-Uélé, Ituri provinces 33rd military region: Maniema, South Kivu provinces 34th military region: North Kivu province |
| *Defence zones are inter-force commands; units from all FARDC branches within a geographic area operate under a unified command. | |
| Category | Type | Quantity/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Combat Aircraft | Su-25 | ~6 (originally 10 in 1999 plus 2 in 2012) |
| MiG-23 | 2 (unserviceable) | |
| Trainer Aircraft | MB-326GB | 8 (status unclear, possibly in storage) |
| MB-326K | 6 (status unclear, possibly in storage) | |
| Transport Aircraft | An-26 Curl | 1 |
| C-130H Hercules | 1 | |
| Il-76 Candid | 2-3 | |
| Boeing 727 | 2 | |
| Boeing 737 (BBJ/VIP) | 1 | |
| Attack Helicopter | Mi-24K/V/B | 8 (3 damaged or unserviceable) |
| Transport/Utility Helicopter | Bell 206 | 2 |
| UH-1H | 5 | |
| Mi-8/17 | ~6 (number survivable unknown) | |
| Mi-26 | 1 (non-operational) | |
| SA 330 Puma | 10 (status unknown) | |
| Surveillance / Reconnaissance | Mwari | 6 (on order) |
| Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) | CH-4 | 3-6 (of 9 ordered) |
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Air Group Components |
HQ (administrative, logistics, and services units) Air bases Air stations Air defence units Squadrons |
| 1st Air Group | Western space, corresponds to the 1st defence zone |
| 2nd Air Group | Southern space, corresponds to the 2nd defence zone |
| 3rd Air Group | Northern and eastern spaces, corresponds to the 3rd defence zone |
| Category | Vessel Name | Class/Type |
|---|---|---|
| Patrol Vessel(s) | 1: Shanghai II | Non-operational |
| Several small river craft, Rigid inflatable boats | N/A |
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | Kinshasa |
| Naval Groups |
1st Naval Group: Congo River, Ubangi, Kwilu, Kasai rivers and Lake Maï-Ndombe 2nd Naval Group: Lakes Tanganyika, Moero, and the inland waters of the second defence zone 3rd Naval Group: Lakes Kivu, Albert and Edward, Semliki River, Congo River and the inland waters of the third defence zone 4th Naval Group: Congo River, Atlantic coast, Shiloango-Tonde rivers |
Defence Economics
| DRC Defence Spending | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (Congolese Franc, FC, billion) | |||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Defence Spending | 422.07 | 454.91 | 399.98 | 428.97 | 477.27 | 582 | 670.33 | 600.51 | 749.35 | 1830.15 | 2541.20 |
| Average USD Exchange Rate | 920 | 920 | 1031.25 | 1501.25 | 1617.50 | 1645 | 1865.45 | 1979.63 | 1999.95 | 2397.50 | 2818.25 |
| DRC Defence Spending | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (USD, million/billion) | |||||||||||
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Defence Spending (million USD) | 458.77 | 494.47 | 387.86 | 285.74 | 295.06 | 353.80 | 359.34 | 303.34 | 374.68 | 763.36 | 901.70 |
| GDP (billion USD) | 38.35 | 40.15 | 38.09 | 39.46 | 48.04 | 50.89 | 49.61 | 55.33 | 63.32 | 64.40 | 70.01 |
| Defence Spending as % of GDP | 1.20% | 1.23% | 1.02% | 0.72% | 0.61% | 0.70% | 0.72% | 0.55% | 0.59% | 1.19% | 1.27% |
DRC Arms Control
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) conventional arms control regime is a combination of ageing domestic legislation and a growing number of international and regional commitments. This evolving framework reflects the country’s long history of conflict and ongoing international efforts to foster stability and curb the illicit flow of weapons.
As is the case for most arms control regimes across the globe, the DRC’s arms control regime is firmly rooted in domestic law, namely Ordinance-Law no. 85-035 of 3 September 1985. This central piece of legislation dates back to Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and established an effective state monopoly on the manufacture, import, and export of “armes de guerre” or military-grade weapons and munitions. It stipulated that no person or entity may possess such arms without the explicit consent of the President, except for the armed forces, though they are still subject to internal government authorisation processes.
However, this 40-year-old piece of legislation has been widely criticised for being outdated and ill-equipped to handle the complexities of the modern arms trade and arms proliferation. Unlike other, more modern, domestic conventional arms control regimes in Africa, such as those in South Africa or Kenya, the law does not establish a semi-independent entity to regulate and govern the production or internal or international transfer of arms. Nor does it require any kind of reporting mechanism or database which could be used to track arms flows within the country and/or transnationally. Crucially, it also fails to provide any practical criteria to be used when a decision needs to be taken to approve or deny a permit request, limiting the potential for accountability should abuses or improper actions take place.
Having noted some of these shortcomings and in the face of sustained international pressure, the government of the DRC has been involved in several ongoing domestic, regional, and international efforts to modernise elements of the country’s arms control regime. The DRC was subject to a UN arms embargo from 2003 until 2008, when most restrictions were lifted. The embargo was replaced by a ‘reporting requirement’ which required UN member states and the DRC to report any and all arms transfers to the DRC to the Sanctions Committee. Notably, this requirement would come to an eventual end in December 2022 following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2667, although the same resolution included a request for ongoing confidential reporting on the status of stockpiles and anti-diversion measures.
These modernisation efforts have been predominantly focused on curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the DRC and the region. As a result, the DRC is a signatory to a range of international agreements aimed at combating the illicit trade in SALW, including the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, the Kinshasa Convention, and the Nairobi Protocol. The latter two foster cooperation and the harmonisation of arms control legislation among states in the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. While these commitments by the DRC government should be lauded, the DRC has yet to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty, the premier international agreement on overseeing and regulating international arms transfers.
In summary, although the DRC’s conventional arms control regime remains anchored in antiquated legislation, the country’s apparent commitment to regional and international agreements indicates a willingness to improve the country’s approach to arms control. However, if these sentiments are not accompanied by a more comprehensive domestic overhaul (including enhanced regulation of and safeguards for the transfer of conventional/military arms), the DRC’s arms control regime will remain ill-equipped to address current and future arms control challenges.
Defence Industry & Partners
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) defence industry is extremely small, with no significant capabilities to speak of. As a consequence, the country is almost entirely dependent on foreign suppliers to meet its defence needs. However, the government has taken several small steps aimed at fostering greater self-reliance, at least in terms of ammunition.
The DRC’s domestic arms production is largely limited to small arms and ammunition production and is the result of Kinshasa’s drive to decrease its dependence on foreign munitions and gain greater flexibility when combating eastern rebels. One notable example is the joint venture between the DRC’s state-owned munitions company ‘Société Africaine d’Explosifs’ or Afridex and China’s Norinco for the production of AK-47s and their ammunition. This venture is aimed at ensuring the FARDC has sufficient access to small arms and ammunition. Another key example is the more recent agreement between Afridex and the Turkish arms company Atesci; this joint venture intends to expand the capacity and capability of the DRC to produce consumable military goods such as rifle ammunition, mortar rounds, and potentially large-calibre artillery.
In addition to this limited industrial cooperation, the DRC maintains a close defence relationship with a number of foreign powers in order to meet its defence needs. The bulk of the country’s heavy military equipment such as tanks and combat aircraft originates from Ukraine, with China being its other major supplier of military equipment. Other notable suppliers of arms, munitions, and equipment are South Africa, the United States, and Egypt, with the latter recently completing an agreement with the DRC for Egypt’s state-owned Arab Organisation for Industrialisation to supply the FARDC with light weapons and ammunition.
State of Military Forces
Originally formed in the aftermath of the Second Congo War and the installation of a transitional government in 2003, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) was established as an amalgamation of government forces and various rebels and other armed groups. Presently, the FARDC consists of the Land Forces (Forces Terrestres), Air Force (Force Aérienne), Navy (Marine Nationale), and the Republican Guard (Garde Républicaine), a unit reporting directly to the President.
While relatively large, the FARDC is currently embroiled in a protracted and complex security crisis as well as an ongoing struggle with ingrained institutional and organisational problems which severely hamper its combat effectiveness. These factors range from a low level of morale to insufficient infrastructure and equipment to effectively ensure the security of a country the size of the DRC. Additionally, widespread corruption has frequently led to the FARDC’s failure to pay soldiers’ salaries in full, with thousands of veterans owed millions. In short, the FARDC remains notorious for its corruption and a general lack of professionalism. They are inadequately equipped, supported and housed, and in general the land forces are ill-disciplined and underfunded, resulting in soldiers preying on the local population when deployed.
Additionally, the FARDC has frequently been accused of cooperating with illegally armed groups in the DRC as part of their fight with other armed groups in the country’s east. The FARDC has also been subject to widespread accusations of abuse, including the rape, extortion, and extrajudicial killing of civilians. Various international agencies and organisations such as the UN, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch routinely document such abuses, noting that these crimes often go unpunished.
As part of local and international efforts to strengthen the FARDC’s technical capabilities, the DRC government has signed numerous bilateral agreements (in excess of 15) with foreign defence forces for training and other practical assistance measures. South Africa, for example, provided training for the FARDC on numerous occasions over a number of years as part of Operation Thebe as well as SADC and UN initiatives. Similarly, other countries and entities such as the United States, China, Tanzania, Kenya, and the European Union have provided similar assistance. While these efforts are ongoing, the reality is they have yielded few results.
Notably, much of the FARDC’s equipment is poorly maintained, obsolete, or inoperable. Currently, the Army can be considered to be considerably better equipped and resourced than the other branches of the DRC’s armed forces, having benefited from a concerted effort on the part of the central government to pursue a limited force modernisation programme. The Navy has no significant operational assets other than a number of small craft used for patrolling the Congo River and major lakes the DRC borders.
The DRC Air Force also suffers from lack of funding and obsolete equipment, with much of its fleet inoperable. However, like the Army, the Air Force has also benefited from a modest force modernisation programme, obtaining two additional Su-25s from Ukraine in 2012, as well as a small number of transport aircraft and approximately 6 CH-4 UAVs from China. Additionally, there are reports of ongoing negotiations for the FARDC to acquire a number of armed Wing Loong II UAVs from China, while the FARDC has recently also placed an order for six South African Mwari surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft.
However, despite new equipment, international training, the presence and support of the UN through its largest peacekeeping mission, the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), as well as other peace enforcement (offensive) missions from the East Africa Community through the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) (defunct) and Southern African Development Community’s SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) (also now defunct), the FARDC remains a largely ineffective force, unable to adequately deal with the security challenges, particularly in the east of the country. Most notably the M23 rebel movement, which, with the support of Rwanda, has made significant advances this year, taking control of Goma (eastern DRC’s largest city) and large parts of the North and South Kivu provinces.
Country Threat Report
| Threat Type | Overview |
|---|---|
| External |
• The principal external threat to the DRC is Rwanda. • The DRC faces routine interference by regional actors in its internal affairs, particularly from various armed groups active in the east of the country. • Relations with neighbours are strained, most prominently with Rwanda. While a full-scale war is unlikely, Rwanda is accused of fuelling the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC by supporting the M23 rebels, with an estimated 3,000 Rwandan soldiers deployed alongside M23. |
| Internal |
• The DRC faces a long-standing insurgency by multiple rebel and militant groups in North and South Kivu and the Ituri region, most notably the M23. • Other active groups include the Allied Democratic Forces, Cooperative for the Development of Congo, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and several Mai-Mai groups, contributing to ongoing conflict and tensions with neighbouring states. • Estimates place the number of armed groups in eastern DRC above 100. Combined with the FARDC’s combat ineffectiveness, the central government’s ability to govern and ensure security is severely hampered. • The withdrawal of MONUSCO from South Kivu and SAMIDRC forces from the country is likely to exacerbate the security vacuum and could lead to a resurgence of other or new armed groups. |
| Regional |
• Internal security challenges in the Central African Republic and South Sudan may seriously affect DRC foreign and security policies. • Renewed tension between Rwanda and Burundi may negatively impact DRC’s internal security and foreign/security policy. |
| Political |
• Although politically stable since the 2012 elections, sporadic political violence and anti-government protests occur. • Tensions persist between policymakers in Kinshasa and Katanga province, especially regarding resource revenue sharing and the devolution of powers/responsibilities. |
| Economic |
• The DRC has vast natural and mineral resources, but conflict, weak governance, and corruption have led to underutilisation and wastage. • Eastern conflict requires more funding for the armed forces, depriving other government departments. • Conflict reduces access to mineral wealth, undermining state revenue, and minerals have been used to fund fighting. • The Congolese franc (CDF) is prone to volatility, undermining the monetary position. • Heavy reliance on imported food, fuel, and consumer goods makes the DRC vulnerable to global economic shifts. |
External Deployments
| Operation | Country | Personnel |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | N/A |
Military Exercises
| Level | Name | Participants | Force Involved | Last Held |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regional | SAMIDRC Training Together for Peace in the DRC | DRC; SADC member states | Army; Marine | 2024 |
| Regional | MONUSCO FARDC Training | DRC; MONUSCO forces | Army | 2024 |
| International | Obangame Express | DRC; Angola; Benin; Belgium; Brazil; Cabo Verde; Cameroon; Côte d’Ivoire; Denmark; France; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; Italy; Liberia; Morocco; Namibia; Netherlands; Nigeria; Portugal; Republic of Congo; Sao Tome & Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Spain; Togo; United Kingdom; United States | Navy | 2025 |
Sponsors
